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The Cultural Cognition Project (CCP) at Yale Law School and the Project on Law
and Mind Sciences (PLMS) at Harvard Law School draw on similar research and
share a similar goal of uncovering the dynamics that shape risk perceptions, policy
beliefs, and attributions underlying our laws and legal theories. Nonetheless, the
projects have failed to engage one another in a substantial way. This Article attempts
to bridge that gap by demonstrating how the approach taken by PLMS scholars can
crucially enrich CCP scholarship. As a demonstration, this Article engages the case of
Scott v. Harris, 550 US. 372 (2007), the subject of a recent CCP study.
In Scott, the Supreme Court relied on a videotape of a high-speed police chase to
conclude that an officer did not commit a Fourth Amendment violation when he
purposefully caused the suspect's car to crash by ramming the vehicle's back bumper.
Challenging the Court's conclusion that "no reasonable juror" could see the
motorist's evasion of the police as anything but extremely dangerous, CCP Professors
Dan M Kahan, David A. Hoffman, and Donald Braman showed the video to 1350
people and discovered clear rifts in perception based on ideological, cultural, and
other lines.
Despite the valuable contribution of their research in uncovering the influence of
identity-defining characteristics and commitments on perceptions, Kahan, Hoffman,
and Braman failed to engage what may well be a more critical dynamic shaping the
cognitions of their subjects and the members of the Supreme Court in Scott: the role of
situational frames in guiding attributions of causation, responsibility, and blame. As
social psychologists have documented-and as PLMS scholars have emphasized-
while identities, experiences, and values matter, their operation and impact is not
t Copyright © 2010 Adam Benforado.
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stable across cognitive tasks, but rather is contingent on the way in which information
is presented and the broader context in which it is processed
In large part, the Scott video is treated-both by the Supreme Court and by Kahan,
Hoffman, and Braman-as if it presents a neutral, unfiltered account of events.
However, it does not. Studies of viewpoint bias suggest that the fact that the video
offers the visual and aural perspective of a police officer participating in the chase-
rather than that of the suspect or a neutral third party-likely had a significant effect
on both the experimental population and members of the Court.
Had the Supreme Court watched a different video of the exact same events taken
from inside the suspect's car, this case may never have been taken away from the jury.
Any discussion of judicial "legitimacy "-in both the descriptive and normative
sense-must start here. The real danger for our justice system may not ultimately be
the "visible fiction " ofa suspect's version of events, as Justice Scalia would have it, or
cognitive illiberalism as Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman would, but the invisible
influence ofsituationalframes systematically prejudicing those who come before our
courts.
INTRODUCTION
The cop-car camera: scourge of the sadist police officer and savior of the innocent
and vulnerable. Before its unblinking gaze, fabricated stories wilt and the truth is
revealed-or so the Supreme Court would have us believe.
Though reluctant to turn the lens on themselves,1 recently, the camera-shy members
of the Court have been anything but bashful in their embrace of video technology as a
tool of justice. Petitioners have taken notice. In his February 2009 filing, Jesse D.
Buckley encouraged the Court to view a videotape taken from a dashboard camera
showing him being Tasered by an officer while lying on the ground, crying, with his
hands cuffed behind his back.2 As Michael R. Masinter, one of Buckley's lawyers, told
the New York Times, "video evidence is inherently more compelling than recorded
testimony."'3 It "offers a uniquely clear record of events against which to articulate a
standard for future cases.
'A
1. See, e.g., Financial Services and General Government Appropriations for 2008:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Services and General Government Appropriations
of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. 28-29 (2007) (statement of Anthony M.
Kennedy, J., Supreme Court of the United States) ("[A]lI in all, I think it would destroy a
dynamic that is now really quite a splendid one and I don't think we should take that chance.");
C-Span.org, Cameras in the Courts, http://www.c-span.org/camerasinthecourt ("1 have come to
the conclusion that it will misinform the public rather than inform the public to have our
proceedings televised." (quoting Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States, Remarks at a "Constitutional Conversation" at the Nat'l Constitution Ctr. (Apr. 21,
2005))).
2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Buckley v. Rackard, No. 08-996, cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
2381 (2009), available at http://www.aclufl.org/pdfs/BuckleyCert-final.pdf. As Buckley pointed
out in his petition, the video is available in the lower court record and was posted on YouTube.
3. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Enters the YouTube Era, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at
A12.
4. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 12.
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Buckley's attorneys had reason to be confident in such assertions: just two years
ago, the Supreme Court signaled its agreement in Scott v. Harrisf In that case,
involving a young man who was rendered a quadriplegic when the police purposefully
rammed his car at the end of a high-speed chase, the Court based its determination that
"no reasonable" juror could find that the man's driving did not expose the public to a
deadly risk entirely on video footage taken from inside the pursuing police cars.
6
Calling the "[r]espondent's version of events ... utterly discredited by the record,"
Justice Antonin Scalia explained that "[tihe Court of Appeals should not have relied on
such visible fiction; it should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the
videotape."7 In a showing of confidence, the Court posted a link to the video on its
website and invited members of the public to watch it.
8
With the invitation made, three members of Yale Law School's Cultural Cognition
Project (CCP)--Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, and Donald Braman--decided to
call the Court's bluff that "the videotape . . . speak[s] for itself' and had a diverse
sample of 1350 Americans watch a clip and then offer their assessments of the depicted
events. 9
The results were startling. 10 While "[a] fairly substantial majority did interpret the
facts the way the Court did,"" the sample demonstrated significant stratification of
opinion concerning the video along ideological, cultural, and other lines. Affluent,
politically conservative white males, with hierarchical and individualist cultural
5. 550 U.S. 372 (2007). Although Scott may be accurately classified as a watershed case, it
was not the first time that the Supreme Court had occasion to affirm the value of film in
determining what really happened in a case. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 547
(1965) ("Our conclusion that the entire meeting from the beginning until its dispersal by tear gas
was orderly and not riotous is confirmed by a film of the events taken by a television news
photographer, which was offered in evidence as a state exhibit. We have viewed the film, and it
reveals that the students, though they undoubtedly cheered and clapped, were well-behaved
throughout.").
6. While the Supreme Court repeatedly refers to a single videotape, see, for example,
Scott, 550 U.S. at 378 (referencing "existence in the record of a videotape capturing the events
in question"), there were "four police tapes which captured portions of the pursuit, all recorded
from different officers' vehicles" entered into evidence and viewed by the court of appeals
panel, id. at 395 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 380-81.
8. Id. at 378 n.5. In fact, two videos were uploaded to the Supreme Court's website. Dan
M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going To Believe? Scott
v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REv. 837, 856 (2009)
[hereinafter Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?] ("The two tapes were recorded by the two pursuing
police cars, which, at around the midpoint of the chase, swap positions relative to the fleeing
Harris.").
9. See Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 841 .The footage that Kahan, Hoffman,
and Braman used was a composite of the two videos uploaded by the Supreme Court, each taken
from a car participating in the chase. "The study video consist[ed] of those portions of each tape
recorded when the filming vehicle was the lead car in the chase and omit[ted] those portions of
each recorded when the car filming was in the trailing position." Id. at 856.
10. For a law review article, the study has garnered an unusual amount of popular attention.
See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 3; Christopher Shea, Cognitive Illiberalism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2009, (Magazine), at 30.
11. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 841.
2010] 1335
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worldviews, were far more prodefendant in their perceptions of the police chase than
educated, but less affluent, African American, liberal women with egalitarian and
communitarian views. 12 Watching the same tape, identifiable subgroups of citizens
reached strongly divergent conclusions concerning whether the chase was worth the
risk, whether Harris posed a lethal danger to the police and the public, whether the
police were justified in terminating the chase using deadly force, and whether Harris
was more at fault than the police.
13
With evidence that individuals' defining characteristics and backgrounds clearly
matter when it comes to perception, Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman took the Supreme
Court to task for failing to acknowledge "that there was [not] only one 'reasonable'
view of the facts.",
14
Under these circumstances, ordering that the case be decided summarily based on
the video was wrong precisely because doing so denied a dissenting group of
citizens the respect they were owed, and hence denied the law the legitimacy it
needs, when the law adopts a view of the facts that divides citizens on social,
cultural, and political lines.' s
As explored in this Article, the admonition was sound, but ultimately incomplete.
While Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman were correct to attribute the rifts in interpretation
of the video to the psychological proclivity of "individuals to resolve disputed facts in
a manner supportive of their group identities,"' 6 they failed to address another-and
perhaps more critical---element informing the cognition of facts, risks, and culpability
at issue in the case: the role of exterior situation in shaping the processing and
interpretation of taped events. When watching the same incidents, "different people,
with different experiences, can see different things;"' 17 yet, just as crucial, the same
person can also see different things depending on how information is presented and the
broader context in which it is perceived.
Overall, the choice of the CCP not to engage social psychological evidence on the
influence of exterior situation is a major limitation for the approach. The purpose of
this Article is to demonstrate the great benefits of incorporating insights, in this regard,
from Harvard Law School's Project on Law and Mind Sciences (PLMS), another
major scholarly endeavor dedicated to uncovering the dynamics that shape the
perceptions, beliefs, and attributions underlying our laws and legal theories. Taken
together, these projects offer a robust challenge to the dominant conception of the
human actor envisioned by conventional law and economics, and Part I of this Article
considers the strong parallels and connections between the two undertakings, before
turning to a key distinction concerning the power of exterior situation.
To better understand the significance of this divergence in a concrete, real-world
setting, Part II then takes up the subject of a recent CCP study, the videotaped chase in
Scott v. Harris. As an illustration of the importance of exterior situation, this Article,
12. Id. at 879.
13. Id. at 872-79.
14. Id. at 838.
15. Id. at 887.
16. Id. at 838.
17. Id. at 848 (emphasis in original).
(Vol. 85:13331336
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first, examines research from the mind sciences on the impact of viewpoint bias on
attributions and, second, applies that research to the details of the Scott case and the
CCP study. The analysis suggests that the fact that the video in Scott offers the visual
and aural perspective of a police officer participating in the chase-rather than that of
the suspect or a neutral third party-likely had a significant effect on the processing
and construal of essential facts by both members of the Supreme Court and the
experimental population. In light of this discussion, the Article explores the
implications of acknowledging the effects of camera perspective bias for the CCP
project's normative claims and, more crucially, for the authority of our legal system.
The principal threat to justice presented by the Supreme Court's opinion may not
ultimately be "the cost to democratic legitimacy associated with labeling the
perspective of persons who share a particular cultural identity 'unreasonable' and
hence unworthy of consideration in the adjudicatory process,"' 8 but rather the Court's
sanction of a technology that, by offering an invisible but compelling situational frame,
systematically prejudices those who come before our courts. We may need to worry
less about potential jurors and more about actual suspects. Part II concludes with an
overview of how viewpoint bias fits into the wider array of situational factors that are
affecting cognition of the key facts in Scott.
Part III presents some of the broader implications of the preceding analysis for
criminal law and suggests that the critique presented in this Article may be applicable
to other CCP work.
I. CONNECTING PROJECTS: UNDERSTANDING COGNITION
What shapes our risk perceptions, policy beliefs, and attributions? What makes us
favor the death penalty? What influences our conviction that guns make society safer?
What pushes us to blame the obese or the bankrupt for their conditions? These types of
questions are vitally important to law and legal theory because without a sound
understanding of human cognition, there is little hope of developing effective strategies
for addressing societal problems.
Two projects-one at Yale and one at Harvard-have been created in the last few
years to address just such issues. Although the projects share similar aims and draw on
similar resources, they have not engaged each other in a substantial way and the
purpose of this Article is to show the potential for that collaboration.
A. The Cultural Cognition Project
The CCP at Yale Law School is composed of a set of academics dedicated to using
social psychology, anthropology, communications, and political science, among other
fields, to uncover how cultural values influence public risk perceptions and associated
policy beliefs.' 9 The term "cultural cognition," itself, references the proclivity of
18. Id. at842.
19. For a sample of scholarship from the CCP, see Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan,
Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics:
Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55 EMORY L.J. 569 (2006); John Gastil, Justin Reedy,
Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Deliberation Across the Cultural Divide: Assessing the
Potential for Reconciling Conflicting Cultural Orientations to Reproductive Technology, 76
20101 1337
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humans "to conform their beliefs about disputed matters of fact ... to values that
define their cultural identities., 20 While those with divergent cultural values may
interpret the same evidence very differently, people with shared backgrounds and
identities often engage information similarly because they rely on common culture
when they go to make sense of actors and events.2' Their shared values act as a
powerful constraint on cognition: "people are motivated to believe that behavior they
find noble is also socially beneficial (or at least benign) and behavior they find base is
also socially harmful., 22 Thus, individuals "fit their perceptions of how the world does
work to their shared appraisals of how the world should work: forming beliefs at odds
with their core values exposes them to dissonance and risks putting them in conflict
with others whose opinions of them affect both their material and emotional well-
being. 23
Egalitarians and communitarians, for example, worry about environmental risks
(nuclear power accidents, global warming, air pollution, etc.), the abatement of
which would justify regulating commercial activities that generate inequality and
legitimize the unconstrained pursuit of individual self-interest.
Iidividualists, in contrast, reject claims of environmental risk precisely because
they cherish markets and private orderings. They worry instead that excessive gun
control will render individuals unable to defend themselves-a belief congenial to
the association of guns with individualist virtues such as self-reliance, courage,
and martial prowess.
2 4
"[T]he unperceived cognitive impact of' these values and identities drives many key
divisions in society25-including debates over homosexuality, the death penalty,
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1772 (2008); Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L.
REv. 115 (2007) [hereinafter Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State];Dan M. Kahan & Donald
Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 149 (2006)
[hereinafter Kahan & Braman, Cultural Cognition]; Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-
Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Kahan &
Braman, Self-Defensive Cognition]; Kahan et al., Whose Eyes, supra note 8. For other papers,
see The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, http://research.yale.edu/
culturalcognition.
20. The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, supra note 19. These scholars are
also interested in a related set of social psychological processes-including the culpable control
model of blame and identity-protective cognition--that explain how group values and identities
can influence cognition of facts. See Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 852
("[C]ognition of blame-relevant 'facts' (volition, action, causation, harm) is motivated by the
subconscious desire to form blame attributions that accord with moral evaluations of the agent's
character or lifestyle.... As a means of psychological self-defense.., people tend to process
information in a selective fashion that bolsters beliefs dominant within their self-defining
groups." (emphasis in original)).
21. Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in
"Acquaintance Rape" Cases 3 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 196, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=1437742##.
22. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 852.
23. Kahan, supra note 21, at 3.
24. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, supra note 19, at 123.
25. Kahan & Braman, Self-Defensive Cognition, supra note 19, at 49 (emphasis omitted);
1338 [Vol. 85:1333
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abortion, subversive speech, and drug use26-- and the CCP's explicit normative goal is
"to identify processes of democratic decision making by which society can resolve
culturally grounded differences in belief in a manner that is both congenial to persons
of diverse cultural outlooks and consistent with sound public policy making."
27
B. The Project on Law and Mind Sciences
The PLMS at Harvard Law School is composed of a related set of academics
(known as "critical realists," "situationists," or "behavioral realists") focused on
employing the insights of social psychology, social cognition, cognitive neuroscience,
and associated disciplines to better understand the origins of human behavior and,
consequently, to build a more realistic account of the human animal upon which legal
analysis and theory can be grounded.28 For scholars involved in the project, engaging
evidence from the mind sciences means rejecting a common-sense dispositionist
account of human action, based on a myth of stable preferences, rationality, and free
choice, in favor of an account acknowledging the powerful role of situational factors-
see also Kahan & Braman, Cultural Cognition, supra note 19, at 14-50.
26. See Kahan & Braman, Cultural Cognition, supra note 19, at 149-50; Kahan et al.,
Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 853.
27. The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, supra note 19. As Kahan and
Braman explain further, cognitive illiberalism "subverts the ends of persons-we think the vast
majority of citizens in American society-who genuinely believe the law should not be used to
impose a cultural orthodoxy, even if the values being forced on others are their own." Kahan &
Braman, Self-Defensive Cognition, supra note 19, at 5 (emphasis in original).
28. For a sampling of PLMS scholarship, see Adam Benforado, The Body of the Mind:
Embodied Cognition, Law, and Justice, 54 ST. Louis U. L.J. (forthcoming 2010); Adam
Benforado & Jon Hanson, Legal Academic Backlash: The Response of Legal Theorists to
Situationist Insights, 57 EMORY L.J. 1087 (2008) [hereinafter Benforado & Hanson, Legal
Academic Backlash]; Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Naive Cynicism: Maintaining False
Perceptions in Policy Debates, 57 EMORY L.J. 499 (2008) [hereinafter Benforado & Hanson,
NaYve Cynicism]; Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Costs ofDispositionism: The Premature
Demise of Situationist Law and Economics, 64 MD. L. REv. 24 (2005); Adam Benforado & Jon
Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent Views of Human Behavior Are
Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 328-38 (2008) [hereinafter Benforado & Hanson,
The Great Attributional Divide]; Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, Broken
Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645 (2004) [hereinafter Benforado et
al., Broken Scales]; Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of
Knowledge Structures on Law andLegal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 1103 (2004) [hereinafter
Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased]; Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The
Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1 (2004); Jon
Hanson & Michael McCann, Situationist Torts, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1345 (2008); Jon Hanson
& David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical
Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003) [hereinafter
Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation]; Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A
Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEo. L.J. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Hanson &
Yosifon, The Situational Character]; Goutam U. Jois, Stare Decisis Is Cognitive Error, 75
BROOKLYN L. REv. 63 (2009); Julie Seaman, Hate Speech andidentity Politics: A Situationalist
Proposal, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 (2008); David Yosifon, Legal Theoretic Inadequacy and
Obesity Epidemic Analysis, 15 GEo. MASON L. REv. 681 (2008).
13392010]
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that is, generally unappreciated cognitive proclivities and structures (interior situation)
and external environmental forces (exterior situation)--in shaping behavior.29
1. Interior Situation
PLMS scholars would consider the values and basic cultural commitments that
define an individual's cultural identity and that shape an individual's cognition to be
elements of interior situation (more specifically, in characterizing the same dynamics,
they would describe the operation of such worldviews with respect to knowledge
structures, affective states, and motives, among other things). 30 Just like those engaged
in the CCP, they would readily accept that these values (in PLMS terms, underlying
knowledge structures, motives, and the like) are the result of life experiences, genetics,
or some combination of the two, and that they have a powerful influence on cognitive
process, attitudes, and behavior.
31
With this shared understanding, the two projects both identify a potent divide
concerning the interior situations of Americans. In both bodies of work, this divide in
worldviews informs the major policy conflicts of our times. 32
29. See generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 28.
30. For example, as PLMS professors Jon Hanson and David Yosifon have explained,
We process stimuli "through preexisting systems of schematized and abstracted
knowledge-beliefs, theories, propositions, and schemas. These knowledge
structures label and categorize objects and events quickly and, for the most part,
accurately. They also define a set of expectations about objects and events and
suggest appropriate responses to them."
Thus, the benefit of such knowledge structures is that they provide us, often
automatically, with a way of understanding our world so that we can operate
reasonably well within it, at the same time that they free up cognitive capacity to
cope with other pressing issues.
Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 28, at 51 (quoting RICHARD E.
NISBETr & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT
7 (1980)); see also Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 28, at 1182 ("'When a
particular emotion is activated ... schemas and other cognitive materials that are tagged with
that emotion will be primed for both the identification of mood-congruent stimulus material and
for the recall of congruent material from memory.' In other words, affect influences the schemas
people apply to interpret events." (quoting Walter H. Crockett, Schemas, Affect, and
Communication, in COMMUNICATION, SOCIAL COGNITION, AND AFFECT 33, 46-47 (Lewis
Donohew et al. eds., 1988) (alteration in original))).
31. See Benforado & Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide, supra note 28, at 381-99
(discussing research concerning the genetic and external situational influences on worldviews);
Dan M. Kahan & Paul Slovic, Cultural Evaluations of Risk. "Values" or "Blunders "?, 119
HARV. L. REv. 166, 170 (2006) ("Perhaps because of upbringing, perhaps because of genetic
disposition, or perhaps because of some combination of the two, people form hierarchic,
egalitarian, individualistic, or communitarian cultural commitments. These commitments, in
turn, supply the values to which individuals conform their beliefs and define the relevant groups
within which social influences on belief operate.").
32. Benforado & Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide, supra note 28, at 403
("[S]tretching across and defining most policy debates, there is a gaping divide arising from two
fundamentally different ways of explaining behavior and events."); Gastil et al., supra note 19,
at 1788 ("[Tlhe divide.., is at the heart of American politics, encompassing (among other
[Vol. 85:13331340
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The CCP scholars have focused on "two prominent and recognizable cultural styles,
which [they] designate[] 'aleph' and 'bet.'Alephs hold conspicuously hierarchical and
individualistic cultural worldviews and (on most questions, at least) highly
conservative political leanings.... Bets, in contrast, hold disproportionately egalitarian
and communitarian views. Their politics are more liberal and Democratic."
33
According to Kahan and his coauthors, aleph and bet cultural styles are pitted against
each other in a range of issues "from affirmative action to gun control, from nuclear
power to abortion, from the death penalty to gay rights.' Alephs and bets demonstrate
significant divergence on risk perceptions, but even more so with respect to
apportioning fault in the creation of risk.35 Relatedly, while alephs approve of highly
punitive responses to defiance of dominant norms, bets tend to support social welfare
programs and view harsh punitive measures as ineffective deterrents.
36
Scholars in the PLMS have identified a very similar pair of salient interior
situations, defined by an attributional divide:
[T]he dispositionist approach, which explains outcomes and behavior with
reference to people's dispositions (i.e., personalities, preferences, and the like),
and the situationist approach, which bases attributions of causation and
responsibility on unseen or unappreciated influences within us and around us.
Those different methods of constructing causal stories and assigning fault not only
color individual issues from gay marriage to welfare and from abortion to social
security reform, but also help define the walls of the broader liberal-conservative
crevasse.
37
The aleph and the dispositionist share much in common: both have extremely
hierarchical and individualistic cultural worldviews and are conservative leaning.38
Similarly, the bet and the situationist exhibit significant consistencies: both have
disproportionately egalitarian and communitarian views and are liberally leaning.
39
To see the connections more clearly, consider the issue of poverty. For the
dispositionist, the poor man is poor because of his flawed disposition: he is lazy; he is
foolish; he abuses drugs. In this view, every person has only himself to blame for
success or failure and, as a result, society should not offer the man assistance. Harsh
treatment-not coddling-is the only way he will be incentivized to change his
behavior. For the situationist, by contrast, poverty is often the result of situational
factors: lack of educational opportunities, the legacy of racism in America,
macroeconomic shifts in the economy, and culturally infused implicit stereotypes and
prejudices, among other things. Consequently, inequality is not viewed as inevitable
things) the partisan divide between Democrats and Republicans, as well as the.., split between
feminism and religious conservativism.").
33. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 862 (emphasis in original).
34. Id. at 862.
35. Id. at 880.
36. Id. at 863-64.
37. Benforado & Hanson, The Great AttributionalDivide, supra note 28, at 314 (emphasis
added).




(and unproblematic), and the situationist is inclined to believe that society has a
responsibility to help those who are struggling.
Thus, although important nuances exist, the attributional approaches that the PLMS
has identified appear to share much with the cultural styles identified by the CCP.
In addition, both projects are concerned with social psychological evidence on our
blindness to our own biases and our quickness to see bias in others:40 what Lee Ross
and his collaborators have dubbed "naive realism.' '41 As summarized in a recent PLMS
article, naive realism has three essential components:
First, we naively believe that we see the world in an objective, neutral manner.
Second, we assume that other reasonable people view the world in the same way
we do-that is, accurately. Finally, when we encounter individuals that see things
in ways that conflict with our own views, we conclude that the difference of
opinion is due to a lack of information, intelligence, or objectivity on their part.42
In both projects, this tendency is of primary importance to the core theory.
For PLMS scholars, nafve realism offers an explanation for how dispositionism
manages to sustain its dominance as an attributional framework despite the fact that it
misses so much of what actually moves us and is generally less accurate than
situationism: rather than engage situationist evidence that might force a reappraisal,
dispositionists "maintain [their] favored views by disparaging the problematic
[situationist] message, discrediting the messenger, or attacking any associated
institution."43 Put differently, as a result of naive realism (and an attendant concept of
naive cynicism), "[o]ur laws and legal theories-far from being determined in a
meritorcratic battle based upon accuracy and effectiveness-have been shaped, and
continue to be shaped, by largely unsupported intuitions and outward claims of
ignorance, misinformation, bias, irrationality, and disloyalty.'"44 When public health
experts, academics, and journalists have provided evidence that obesity has situational
origins and is not just a "personal responsibility" issue, their work has been attacked as
against common sense and totalitarian. 45 They have been written off as know-it-all
nannies and pointy-headed academics and as further proof of the liberal bias of
academia and the media.46 Likewise, in the wake of 9/11, situationist accounts of
events at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and other detention centers engendered a
similar backlash that focused not on the contents of those accounts, but on how they
(and those who asserted them) were biased and a dangerous threat.47 Other PLMS work
40. See, e.g., Benforado & Hanson, LegalAcademic Backlash, supra note 28; Benforado &
Hanson, Naive Cynicism, supra note 28;Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 895-900.
41. Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social
Conflict and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103, 110 (Edward S. Reed, Elliot
Turiel & Terrance Brown eds., 1996).
42. Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism, supra note 28, at 513-14 (citing Ross & Ward,
supra note 41).
43. Id. at 534.
44. Id. at 573.
45. See Benforado et al., Broken Scales, supra note 28, passim.
46. See id.
47. Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism, supra note 28, at 542-72.
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has noted the influence of naive realism and naYve cynicism in the reaction of the
Catholic Church to Galileo and his heliocentric views,48 responses to the abolitionist
movement in the antebellum South,49 backlash to research on global climate change,50
and the reception of social psychological criticisms to the rational actor model of law
and economics. 
5
For CCP scholars, the interest in nafve cynicism comes in its use in understanding
the "dynamics that are likely to distort judicial decision making on factual issues that
divide competing cultural and social groups" and, more broadly, in explicating the
"escalating cycle of recrimination and distrust" in many of our major policy debates.52
Because [individuals] are not generally aware of their own disposition to form
factual beliefs that cohere with their cultural commitments, legislators, policy
analysts, and ordinary citizens manifest little uncertainty about their answers to
these questions. But much worse, because they can see full well the influence that
cultural predispositions have on those who disagree with them, participants in
policy debates often adopt a dismissive and even contemptuous posture toward
their opponents' beliefs. This attitude in turn provokes resentment on the part of
their opponents, who, as a result of naive realism, bridle at the suggestion that they
are conforming their factual beliefs to their values yet see exactly that sort of
process going on in the minds of their (annoyingly smug, it seems) antagonists.5 3
"The result is a state of cognitive illiberalism"5--a state that includes judges as active
citizens. CCP scholars believe that illiberal status competition is deepened when "the
law picks sides in factual disputes that arise from culturally conflicting worldviews."
'55
Thus, a judge ought to temper her "decisionmaking with a prudential sensibility."' 56
"Due humility obliges her to consider whether privileging her own view of the facts




Despite the evident similarities between the two projects, one important difference
is in the treatment of exterior situation.58 As noted earlier, both projects consider
48. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 28, at 189-91, 206-25.
49. See id. at 303-27.
50. See Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism, supra note 28, at 542.
51. See Benforado & Hanson, Legal Academic Backlash, supra note 28, passim.
52. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 895-96.
53. Id, at 895-96 (emphasis in original); see also Kahan & Braman, Self-Defensive
Cognition, supra note 19, at 5.
54. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 897 (emphasis in original).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 899.
57. Id. at 898.
58. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, another important difference between
the projects comes with respect to the issue of whether certain cultural styles or attributional
proclivities embody more accurate worldviews than others. The CCP appears to take a
deliberately neutral position in this regard and to view nonneutrality as a problem. See, e.g.,
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exterior situation to be an important factor in shaping interior situation over time.
Growing up in a wealthy white conservative family in a rural western town would be
expected to encourage an aleph cultural style and a dispositionist attributional
approach.59 Yet, in contrast to the PLMS, the CCP does not address exterior situation
more broadly; indeed, in general, it treats interior situation as fixed when it comes to
the instance of interpreting facts and evaluating risks.6 ° People bring different values
and identities to the table, but once at the table, the values and identities are consistent
and stable. In other words, perhaps with the goal of isolating a dynamic and
simplifying the model, the CCP does not focus attention on exterior situation as an
active element at the moment of engagement with a stimulus. This Article, as part of
the PLMS, asserts that, in many contexts, this omission may be critical: exterior
situation may frequently overwhelm interior situation. Humans may tend to conform
their beliefs about disputed matters of fact to align with their cultural identities, but
Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, supra note 19, at 131 ("Disputes over who is being
'realistic' and who 'naive' about the relationship between cultural commitments and perceptions
of harm is another familiar form of illiberal status competition in our society."). Indeed, David
Arkush has asserted that "[clultural cognition theorists are ambivalent about the normative
implications of their work." David J. Arkush, Situating Emotion: A Critical Realist View of
Emotion and Nonconscious Cognitive Processesfor Law and Legal Theory, 2008 BYU L. REv.
1275, 1349.
Those working on the PLMS, by contrast, argue that social psychology and related fields
have shown that situationism is more accurate (or less certainly inaccurate) than dispositionism
in explaining human behavior. See Benforado & Hanson, The GreatAttributional Divide, supra
note 28, at 317-39. Given that other research has documented that attributional tendencies are
powerfully influenced by elements in our situations, PLMS scholars have been working to
understand which situations tend to encourage dispositionism and which tend to encourage
situationism to understand the sources that "have the greatest potential for developing the
accurate attributions of human behavior that are so important to law." Id. at 319. This distinction
between the two projects is extremely important and will hopefully inspire deeper investigation
in future work.
59. See Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 862. See generally Benforado &
Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide, supra note 28.
60. The CCP also does not engage the possibility that powerful entities might have an
incentive and ability to encourage certain attributional approaches or cultural worldviews by
manipulating exterior situation. This is of great interest to PLMS scholars, who refer to the
efforts by individuals and entities to influence attributional schemas as deep capture. See, e.g.,
Benforado et al., Broken Scales, supra note 28, at 1727-1805 (offering evidence of deep capture
in respect to attributions concerning obesity); Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 28,
at 202-84 (introducing the notion of deep capture).
61. See, e.g., Benforado & Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide, supra note 28, at 328
("The interior sources of dispositionism are often powerfully linked to exterior sources, cues,
and frames.... [T]he strength of our dispositionism changes based on whether we are making a
causal attribution for our own behavior or for others' behavior and based on whether the
outcome is good or bad. We may also make different attributions based on whether we are
caught in the moment or trying to make sense of a past event. Moreover, in some cases, elements
in our environment that appear quite separate from the attribution at hand may influence the
extent of our dispositionism. For example, since the strength of our dispositionism seems to
depend significantly on whether we are facing an outside threat, a series of terrorist attacks may
make us more likely to explain a homeless person's condition as the result of a poor disposition,
as opposed to systemic problems."); see also infra Part II.A.
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different cultural identities within an individual may be implicated based on the nature
of the external situational frame. Put a different way: an aleph does not always engage
the world as an aleph; and a dispositionist does not always see, think, or act as a
dispositionist. Even when confronting the same set of facts, if the situational
presentation or backdrop is altered, a different set of cultural commitments or a
different attributional framework may be highlighted. As social psychological
experiments have shown, sometimes an aleph can be encouraged to view matters or
behave like a bet.
Although the context is slightly different, recent studies on the power of stereotypes
offer strong confirmation of the fact that "people carry with them many rich
dimensions of social identity, and different social situations and goals trigger different
identities,, 62 which, in turn, impacts mental processing. In one representative
experiment, female Asian-American math majors were given a math test. 63 Prior to the
test, some participants had their Asian ethnic identity made salient, while others had
their gender identity highlighted.64 "Performance on the quantitative test was best in the
Asian-identity-salient condition, intermediate in the control condition, and worst in the
female-identity-salient condition., 65 The way the exterior situation was structured by
the experimenters-subtly activating a particular sociocultural category-powerfully
influenced engagement with the stimulus. As other research has substantiated, different
women may bring different identities and experiences to a test situation-and those
identities and experiences do affect cognition of the problems individuals are asked to
answer; yet, all women may have their performance impacted by implicitly activating
gender stereotypes.66 Consequently, if the goal is a complete picture of the processes at
work, it is necessary to consider the effects of both interior and exterior situation, and
the interaction between the two.
62. Margaret Shih, Todd L. Pittinsky & Nalini Ambady, Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity
Salience and Shifts in Quantitative Performance, 10 PSYCHOL. Sci. 80, 80 (1999) (citations
omitted) ("For example, a white, male, Christian accountant may be identified as a male, as
white, as a Christian, or as an accountant. Because different social identities are associated with
different stereotypes, individuals may be susceptible to different, and in some cases even
conflicting, stereotypes.").
63. Id.
64. Id. at 80 ("Common cultural stereotypes hold that Asians have superior quantitative
skills compared with other ethnic groups and that women have inferior quantitative skills
compared with men.").
65. Id. at 81.
66. See, e.g., Joshua Aronson, Diane M. Quinn & Steven J. Spencer, Stereotype Threat and
the Academic Underperformance of Minorities and Women, in PREJUDICE: THE TARGET'S
PERSPECTIVE 83 (Janet K. Swim & Charles Stangor eds., 1998); Claude M. Steele, A Threat in




Figure 1: Three Models of Mental Processing
Cultural Cognition Project
Project on Law and Mind Sciences
To better understand the potential blind spot of the CCP and appreciate the benefits
of incorporating a PLMS approach, it is helpful to turn back to the context of the
videotaped police chase in Scott v. Harris. Evidence from the mind sciences suggests
that exterior situation likely played a vital role in the Supreme Court's decision, with
powerful implications for Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman's study and its normative
conclusions. In the interests of focusing the discussion, the next Part begins with an
investigation of a particular exterior situational dynamic-what is commonly referred
to as "camera perspective bias" (or "illusory causation")-before considering the
relationship between such bias and other situational factors that are influencing the
cognition of events in Scott, in particular implicit racial bias.
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II. THE EXTERIOR SrrUATION OF SC0T v. HARRIS
A. Camera Perspective Bias
1. The Power of Perspective
In countless experiments over many decades, social psychologists have shown that
the way we construe events and the way we make attributions of causation,
responsibility, and blame are powerfully influenced by how facts, images, and stories
are revealed to us. Yet, despite the potent effects of situational framing, we tend to
remain largely oblivious to its influence.67 Indeed, there is a strong human tendency,
among both the sophisticated and naive among us, "to accept problem formulations as
they are given.... [To] remain, so to speak, mental prisoners of the frame provided to
us by the experimentalist, or by the 'expert,' or by a certain situation."
68
In one famous study, individuals were told that the United States was readying for
an epidemic in which 600 people were expected to die.69 Participants were then asked
which of two programs to combat the disease they favored: ifProgram A were adopted,
exactly 200 people would be saved; if Program B were adopted, there would be a one-
third probability that 600 people would be saved and a two-thirds probability that no
67. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 343 (1984). As Gary Blasi and John Jost note, "The terms frame and
framing have come to mean slightly different things in several different disciplines, each of
which has penetrated law and legal scholarship to a different degree." Gary Blasi & John T. Jost,
System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social
Justice, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1119, 1149 (2006) (emphasis in original). This Article uses the terms to
refer to the way that information about the world is presented to us, which impacts how we
define problems, causal agents, and solutions, among other things. For example, a small, run-
down house may be "refriamed" in a real estate brochure as a "cozy, fixer-upper." Likewise, the
agent may choose a photograph taken from a particular angle that makes the home look larger
than it actually is or that hides a rotting porch. In both cases, the frames alter how we make
judgments and answer key questions: Is this home a good investment? Will I be happy if I buy
this house? Will others be impressed with my purchase?
68. Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Probability Blindness: Neither Rational nor Capricious,
BOsTONIA, Mar./Apr. 1991, at 28, 30 (emphasis in original). In a well known demonstration of
the profundity of our blindness to situational manipulations, individuals were randomly assigned
as questioners and contestants in a fake game show. Lee D. Ross, Teresa M. Amabile & Julia L.
Steinmetz, Social Roles, Social Control, and Biases in Social-Perception Processes, 35 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 485 (1977). The questioners were given fifteen minutes to make
up their own general-knowledge trivia questions and then the contestants were tested. Although
observers of the experiment werefully informed of the setup of the quiz--that is, the fact that the
questioners, allowed to choose trivia from what they already knew, were clearly advantaged in
comparison to the contestants, who had no control over the nature of the subject matter-
observers nonetheless rated the general knowledge of the questioners as extremely high and that
of the contestants as low after the contestants missed many of the questions. Those watching
ignored the power of the frame; for them, the game show appeared to present a neutral forum for
making an objective assessment of the dispositions of the participants.
69. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing ofDecisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981).
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people would be saved.7 ° Participants in a second group were asked to rate two other
programs: if Program C were adopted, exactly 400 people would die; if Program D
were adopted, there would be a one-third probability that nobody would die, and a two-
thirds probability that 600 people would die.7 1 Clearly, the choices presented to the two
groups of participants were effectively identical. What changed was the frame: with the
first group, the outcome was described in terms of lives saved; with the second group,
the outcome was described in terms of lives lost. That seemingly inconsequential
alteration had a big effect with "a pronounced shift from risk aversion to risk taking" in
the experimental population: the first group greatly favored Program A ("the prospect
of certainly saving 200 lives is more attractive than a risky prospect of equal expected
value, that is, a one-in-three chance of saving 600 lives");72 the second group greatly
favored Program D ("the certain death of 400 people is less acceptable than the two-in-
three chance that 600 will die"). 73 For both groups, although the question seemed to
offer an entirely neutral means to gauge people's natural preferences, the manner in
which each was framed changed the way people thought about the dilemma beyond
their conscious awareness and in a systematic way. Further, the power of the frame
seemingly transcended group boundaries: people of different backgrounds and
experiences-including university faculty and physicians-were similarly influenced.74
The operation and impact of framing is not confined only to phrasing and word
choices, but also involves shifts in visual perspective, among other things. 75 Indeed,
one of the situational frames that scientists have found to be particularly significant is
whether we are encouraged to see matters from the perspective of an actor or an
observer.76 Point of view seems to matter. Although research suggests that human
behavior is often influenced far more by situational factors than dispositional ones,
when observing others 'acts or circumstances, people exhibit a strong tendency to offer
explanations focused on internal causes (e.g., he is poor because he is lazy) while






75. See id. ("Alternative frames for a decision problem may be compared to alternative
perspectives on a visual scene. Veridical perception requires that the perceived relative height of
two neighboring mountains, say, should not reverse with changes of vantage point. Similarly,
rational choice requires that the preference between options should not reverse with changes of
frame. Because of imperfections of human perception and decision, however, changes of
perspective often reverse the relative apparent size of objects and the relative desirability of
options.").
76. See generally Edward E. Jones, The Rocky Road from Acts to Dispositions, 34 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 107 (1979); Edward E. Jones & Richard E. Nisbett, TheActor and the Observer:
Divergent Perceptions of the Causes of Behavior, in ATTRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF
BEHAVIOR 79 (Edward E. Jones et al. eds., 1972); Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist andHis
Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, in COGNITIVE THEORIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 337 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1978). But see Bertram F. Malle, The Actor-




against by potential employers because of his accent).77 People are less likely to exhibit
this proclivity when making sense of their own identical behavior: engaging the world
as actors, individuals tend to acknowledge more readily situational demands and
constraints.
In an early experiment, greatly relevant to the Scott case, Michael D. Storms
demonstrated the power of the actor-observer difference by using a video camera to
manipulate the visual orientation of individuals asked to perform an attribution task
after engaging in or observing a conversation.78
[W]hen videotape reproduced subjects' original orientations, actors attributed their
behavior relatively more to situational causes than did observers.... But under
conditions of reorientation, when subjects saw a new point of view on videotape,
the attributional differences between actors and observers were exactly reversed.
Reoriented, self-viewing actors attributed their behaviors relatively less to
situational causes than did observers.79
As Emily Pronin and Lee Ross have explained, "[T]he actor-observer difference in
attribution is rooted in differences in the information available or salient to actors
versus observers. For one, observers' visual attention tends to focus on the actor in a
given situation whereas actors' visual attention tends to focus on the circumstances
attending that situation. ', 8 0 In other words, different points of view (i.e., the different
frames) mean that different things draw our focus and it is those conspicuous elements
to which we tend to overattribute causality.8i As the Storms study showed, people are
not stable in their attributional proclivities: if you change the visual perspective, you
can change the attribution. The same person-with all of her identity-defining
characteristics, commitments, and accumulated experiences-can be made to see
things differently by changing her frame of reference.
82
77. See G. Daniel Lassiter, Andrew L. Geers, Patrick J. Munhall, Ian M. Handley & Melissa
J. Beers, Videotaped Confessions: Is Guilt in the Eye of the Camera?, 33 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 189, 197 (2001) ("[T]he findings regarding the fundamental
attribution error and salience effects lead to the conclusion that observers routinely fail to
appreciate fully the causal influence of external factors or pressures on another individual's
behavior and that the problem is compounded when those situational forces are rendered even
less visible or salient by virtue of observers' visual perspective.").
78. Michael D. Storms, Videotape and the Attribution Process: Reversing Actors' and
Observers'Points of View, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 165 (1973).
79. Id. at 171.
80. Emily Pronin & Lee Ross, Temporal Differences in Trait Self-Ascription: When the Self
Is Seen as an Other, 90 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 197, 197 (2006); see also DONALD C.
PENNINGTON, SOCIAL COGNITION 43-44 (2000).
81. The term "illusory causation" is commonly used to describe the tendency of people to
"attribute unwarranted causality (influence) to a stimulus simply because it is more noticeable or
salient than other available stimuli." G. Daniel Lassiter, Illusory Causation in the Courtroom,
11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. Sci. 204, 204 (2002).
82. It is worth noting that those interested in film studies have long understood the power of
camera perspective. See, e.g., Jessica M. Silbey, Filmmaking in the Precinct House and the
Genre of Documentary Film, 29 COLuM. J.L. & ARTS 107 (2005); Jessica M. Silbey, Judges as
Film Critics: New Approaches to Filmic Evidence, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493 (2004).
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More recently, G. Daniel Lassiter and his colleagues have conducted a number of
studies specifically assessing how camera perspective bias may alter the assessment of
whether a videotaped confession is voluntary.83 In an initial experiment, experimenters
had subjects watch a videotaped confession in which the camera was directed at the
interrogator, directed at the suspect, or directed equally at the suspect and the
interrogator. 84 Following the viewing, subjects who observed the suspect's perspective
(with the camera focused on the interrogator) judged the confession to be the most
coerced; subjects who watched the confession from the interrogator's perspective (with
the camera focused on the suspect) judged the confession to be the most voluntary; and
subjects who watched the equal-focus video demonstrated an intermediary
assessment.85 Notably, "participants who had read only a written transcript of the
confession made voluntariness judgments that were most similar to those in the
detective-focus condition," implying that by using a camera angle reflecting the
interrogator's perspective, observers were being led "to judge this particular
interrogation to be less coercive than they would have judged it had the confession
been presented in a more traditional format.,
86
Additional studies have shown that camera perspective bias may not only affect
judgments of whether a confession is voluntary but may also increase the propensity to
find a defendant guilty on the basis of the confession and the severity of a
recommended sentence. 87 With experiments documenting strong effects across
shoplifting, burglary, rape, drug trafficking, and manslaughter confessions, the bias
appears to be potent and generalizable. 8  "[I]n one instance, the simple change from an
equal-focus confession to a suspect-focus confession doubled the conviction rate!" 
89
The impact of illusory causation is evident in the judgments of individuals of
varying identities, backgrounds, and experiences. Even those individuals who naturally
exhibit high needs for cognition and motives for critical thinking--characteristics
linked to reductions in biased judgments in other experiments-have demonstrated a
susceptibility to camera perspective bias.90 In addition, expertise does not appear to
Howard Wasserman also has a nice summary analysis building on some of Sibley's film-studies
work. See Howard M. Wasserman, Video Evidence and Summary Judgment: The Procedure of
Scott v. Harris, 91 JUDICATURE 182 (2008).
83. See Jennifer J. Ratcliff, G. Daniel Lassiter, Heather C. Schmidt & Celeste J. Snyder,
Camera Perspective Bias in Videotaped Confessions: Experimental Evidence of Its Perceptual
Basis, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 197, 197 (2006) (providing an overview).
84. G. Daniel Lassiter, Videotaped Confessions: The Impact of Camera Point of View on
Judgments of Coercion, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 268, 268 (1986).
85. Id.
86. G. Daniel Lassiter, Andrew L. Geers, Ian M. Handley, Paul E. Weiland & Patrick J.
Munhall, Videotaped Interrogations and Confessions: A Simple Change in Camera Perspective
Alters Verdicts in Simulated Trials, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 867, 868 (2002).
87. See Lassiter, supra note 81, at 206; Ratcliff et al., supra note 83, at 197. Other
experiments have demonstrated that "camera perspective bias, or illusory causation, is a
primarily perception-based phenomenon," rather than a memory-based phenomenon: the
viewing frame influences how information is initially registered and perceived, which in turn
impacts attributions. Id. at 202.
88. Lassiter, supra note 81, at 206.
89. Id.
90. See Lassiter, supra note 81, at 206; Ratcliffet al., supra note 83, at 203.
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protect people from the influence of the bias.9' When experimenters presented a
videotaped mock confession to judges and law enforcement officers with significant
experience with interrogations, the judgments of the experts reflected camera
perspective bias just as the assessments of laypeople did.92
Equally troubling, the dynamic is surprisingly persistent and difficult to eliminate.
As Lassiter and his coauthors describe, "[j]udicial instruction emphasizing the need to
be cognizant of reliability and fairness concerns in evaluating the confession and, in
some cases, directly alerting mock jurors to the potentially prejudicial effect of camera
perspective did not mitigate the bias."93 Similarly, introducing scenarios of high
accountability (in which participants were informed that they would have to justify
their judgments) did not diminish the bias, although it did lead to more careful and
diligent information processing." And, encouraging participants to carefully deliberate
by providing them with a greater opportunity to do so was comparably ineffective. 95
2. Overlooking the Frame
Despite the valuable contribution of their research in uncovering the impact of
group identities on perceptions, Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman chose not to engage
what may very well be a more critical dynamic shaping the cognitions of their subjects
and the cognitions of the members of the Supreme Court: the role of the situational
frame in guiding attributions. In large part, the Scott video is treated-both by the
Supreme Court and by Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman-as if it presents a neutral,
unfiltered account of the events.
96
For Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman, the videotape is not the relevant variable when it
comes to cognition; the relevant variable is the person doing the watching (and the
individual characteristics and shared cultural orientation that the person brings to the
observation). From the authors' perspective, it would seem to matter little whether
subjects make an attribution for behavior or assess risk after watching a videotape or
after watching real life. In other words, their concern is that different people interpret
the objective reality of a videotape in different ways because of their particular interior
91. G. Daniel Lassiter, Shari Seidman Diamond, Heather C. Schmidt & Jennifer K. Elek,
Evaluating Videotaped Confessions: Expertise Provides No Defense Against the Camera-
Perspective Effect, 18 PSYCHOL. Sci. 224,225 (2007).
92. Lassiter et al., supra note 91, at 224-25; G. Daniel Lassiter & Andrew L. Geers, Bias
andAccuracy in the Evaluation of Confession Evidence, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESsIONs, AND
ENTRAPMENT 197, 207 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004) ("This was true even for the judges who
had the most prior experience dealing with confession evidence (i.e., those who had previous
experience as prosecutors, criminal defense attorneys, and trial court judges hearing criminal
cases).").
93. Lassiter, supra note 81, at 206 (emphasis added) ("This was true whether the judicial
instruction preceded or followed the presentation of the confession.").
94. G. Daniel Lassiter, Patrick J. Munhall, Andrew L. Geers, Paul E. Weiland & Ian M.
Handley, Accountability and the Camera Perspective Bias in Videotaped Confessions, 1
ANALYsis SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL'Y 53, 53, 63 (2001).
95. See Ratcliffet al., supra note 83, at 203.
96. Unlike the majority, however, the authors assert that different people will interpret the
objective reality of the tape in different ways because of their unique interiors (i.e., their
personal characteristics and shared cultural orientation).
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situations, not that videotapes do not offer objective reality (such that different camera
perspectives can result in different perceptions of underlying facts).
97
In contrast to Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman, who simply elect not to address the
possibility of the video's potential biasing effects, the Supreme Court is far more active
in asserting the tape's value in capturing and presenting an incident exactly as it
actually happened. As Justice Scalia suggested in the majority opinion, since "[t]here
are no allegations or indications that this videotape was doctored or altered in any
way," 98 it naturally follows that the video is an objective record of reality.99 Taking the
cue from the Court, in his February 2009 petition for certiorari, Jesse D. Buckley
emphasized that, as in Scott, "the video [of his arrest] precludes arguments over the
course of events. The indisputable record of these events facilitates clarity too often
foreclosed by conflicting accounts of facts .... ,,100 Lower courts have offered similar
reasoning. As the Tenth Circuit put it in the recent case of Mecham v. Frazier, "The
facts are in little doubt since [the officer's] squad car was equipped with a dashboard
camera which recorded the incident."' 0' A videotape, it would seem, ends the debate.
97. Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman admit as much:
It should also be clear that we are not advancing any sweeping indictment of
judicial consideration of visual or other demonstrative evidence. It is not
unprecedented for the Supreme Court to attach photographs, maps, pictures, and
exhibits to its opinions as support and to refer readers to them. In the aftermath,
too, of Scott, judges might well feel emboldened to give more decisive weight to
the factual inferences they themselves are inclined to draw from videos or
photographs in deciding summary judgment motions. There might well be
compelling grounds for objecting to these and like practices, but the particular
criticism we are making of Scott doesn't go to the propriety of what might be
called a "sensory jurisprudence" generally.
Our concern with the Court's reliance on the Scott tape is much more focused.
Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 900 (footnotes omitted).
98. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
99. In the words of the majority, "the videotape... speak[s] for itself." Id. at 378 n.5. It is
worth noting that Justice Scalia's unwillingness to consider the biasing potential of film with
respect to a police-cruiser camera stands in contrast to his ready acknowledgment of the
potential for bias with respect to his own situation-that is, the videotaping of Supreme Court
oral arguments:
I wouldn't mind having the proceedings of the court... televised, if I thought it
would only go out on a channel that everyone would watch gavel-to-gavel. But if
you send it out on C-SPAN, what will happen is, for every one person who sees it
on C-SPAN gavel-to-gavel... 10,000 will see 15-second sound takeouts on the
network news, which I guarantee you will be uncharacteristic of what the court
does... So, I have come to the conclusion that it will misinform the public rather
than inform the public to have our proceedings televised.
C-Span.org, Cameras in the Courts, http://www.c-span.org/camerasinthecourt (second and third
alterations in original).
100. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 23. Indeed, as Buckley emphasized, the
existence of the video precludes the need for other evidence concerning the nature of events:
"no more compelling confirmation... is necessary than the video." Id. at 17.
101. Mecham v. Frazier, 500 F.3d 1200, 1202 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Zellner v.
Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 371 (2d Cir. 2007) ("Incontrovertible evidence relied on by the
moving party, such as a relevant videotape whose accuracy is unchallenged, should be credited
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But does a patrol-car-mounted video camera actually offer a court-or anyone
else-an unfiltered lens on the facts?
The answer must certainly be "no." In Scott, we are not just watching a high-speed
chase; we are watching a high-speed chase from the perspective of a police officer
participating in the pursuit. 102 Viewing the tape, we are placed literally inside the lead
car, 0 3 hot on the tail of the suspect: we see what the cop closest to the action sees and
hear what he hears, including "radio communication between the pursuing cars and the
police dispatcher."' 1' 4 As we stare at the screen, watching the suspect pilot his Cadillac
in front of us, we are told by the dispatcher to "take him out."'
10 5
To make the point a bit starker, imagine, for a moment, if we had other video
footage. What if the only item in the Supreme Court record had been a clip filmed from
inside a car passing in the opposite direction or by a pedestrian standing at an
intersection? What if the videotape had been taken from a news helicopter circling
above, showing the number of officers in pursuit, all ofthe police roadblocks up ahead,
and the lack of other vehicles on the road? What if the videotape had been taken from
inside Harris's vehicle looking back at the police cars in pursuit? And, on that tape,
what if we could hear the sirens screaming and Harris crying or cursing his bad luck or
wondering aloud if he might be beaten by the officers if he pulled over?
If the video footage in Scott had offered one of these other perspectives, would the
1350 Americans in the CCP study still have felt the same about the recorded events?
Would
[a] very sizable majority of [the] diverse, nationally representative sample [still
have] agreed with the Scott majority that Harris's driving exposed the public and
the police to lethal risks, that Harris was more at fault than the police for putting
the public in danger, and that deadly force ultimately was reasonable to terminate
the chase[?] 106
Would the members of the Supreme Court have been as quick to dispositionalize
Harris's actions, finding him to have "intentionally placed himself and the public in
danger"?10 7 There is good reason to be skeptical. Identities, experiences, and shared
cultural orientations matter, but the situational frame may ultimately be more
influential.
As part of a seminar, "Law and Mind Sciences," I had students in the class watch
the Scott video and offer their assessment of the portrayed events prior to reading
Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman's article. Just as the CCP study found, the individual
by the court on such a motion [for judgment as a matter of law] if it so utterly discredits the
opposing party's version that no reasonable juror could fail to believe the version advanced by
the moving party."); Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234,239 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[Wlhere [a
party's] version of the facts cannot be countenanced based upon what the video shows, this
Court will adopt the video as fact rather than [the party's] version.").
102. See Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 855.
103. Id. at 856 ("The study video consists of those portions of each tape recorded when the
filming vehicle was the lead car in the case and omits those portions of each recorded when the
car filming was in the trailing position.").
104. Id. at 855.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 879.
107. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 373 (2007).
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characteristics of the students-including their race, party affiliation, and cultural
worldviews-seemed to matter. However, I was struck in our subsequent conversation
by the ways in which student comments appeared to be shaped by the visual (and
audio) perspective of the video. The personal anecdotes that individuals felt prompted
to share largely had the students in positions analogous to the police in the video. In a
particularly striking example, one of the most liberal students in the class, who had
expressed strong communitarian and egalitarian perspectives in the previous weeks,
explained how watching the tape reminded her of when she had been driving in Texas
with her girlfriend and two men had followed them in a pickup truck for many miles
after they had stopped at a gas station. She explained how threatened and frightened
she had felt and how, if she had been able to take the pickup truck out, like the police
in the video, she would have. Thus, remarkably, in recounting a story about being
chased and explaining how frightening that experience had been, the student related
herself to the pursuer in the videotape. When asked why she had not naturally
sympathized with the party being chased, she had no explanation and was puzzled with
her reaction. After all, she agreed, thinking about it more, being a nineteen-year-old
black man in Georgia pursued by multiple police cars with their lights flashing and
sirens blaring, knowing how police officers tend to react to those who flee, being
familiar with well-publicized incidents of police brutality toward minority suspects,
and noting the lack of witnesses on the largely empty road to record or intervene in any
potential abuse, maybe continuing to drive on was what most reasonable people in the
suspect's position would do.108 Why had these things not occurred to her before?
The answer, quite simply, is that the chase video did not put her in a position for
these thoughts to be triggered.
A viewer of the video footage was in a good position to acknowledge the situation
of the police officer, but in an exceedingly poor position to appreciate the various
influences on the suspect. As Francis J. Flynn and Joel Brockner have explained, under
such circumstances, "[tihe actor dominates the visual field of the observer, and this
heightened salience of the actor may lead the observer to overattribute the actor's
behavior to dispositions."'09 The result is exactly as would be predicted by the studies
on perspective bias performed over the last four decades by Storms, Lassiter, and other
social psychologists. When Lassiter and his colleagues focused the camera on the
suspect in a police interrogation, observers were far more dispositional in their
attributions-finding that the confession was not influenced by situational factors, such
as police coercion-than when the camera provided the visual perspective of the
108. See id. at 384 ("Multiple police cars, with blue lights flashing and sirens blaring, had
been chasing respondent for nearly 10 miles."); id. at 389 (the chase took place on a "lightly
traveled road in Georgia where no pedestrians or other 'bystanders' were present"); I. Bennett
Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testifying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 846 (2008) ("[P]olls indicate that
minorities consider police brutality more of a problem than whites."). In addition, it is worth
noting that "Scott issued absolutely no warning (e.g., over the loudspeaker or otherwise) prior to
using deadly force." Scott, 550 U.S. at 396 (quoting Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807,
819 n.14 (11 th Cir. 2005), rev'd sub nom., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
109. Francis J. Flynn & Joel Brockner, It's Different To Give than To Receive: Predictors of
Givers' and Receivers' Reactions To Favor Exchange, 88 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1034, 1036
(2003).
1354 [Vol. 85:1333
2010] FRAMES OF INJUSTICE 1355
suspect."10 If we are not literally seeing things through the suspect's eyes, we will often
fail to appreciate the situational influences on their behavior and too quickly judge
their actions as originating in their rotten interiors.
Figure 2: Mental Processing Models of Scoff v. Harris
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3. Implications: Systematic Bias
With its focus on revealing the power of exterior situation on human behavior, the
PLMS adds an important missing component to the CCP. In the end, to make sense of
110. See Lassiter et al., supra note 94, at 55.
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the Supreme Court's reaction to the Scott videotape and the data that Kahan, Hoffman,
and Braman provide, it is not enough to simply understand and catalogue the web of
cultural commitments, experiences, and identities within each observer. It is also
critically important to understand the role of exterior situational factors, like camera
perspective, in shaping cognition.
Videotapes shot from the viewpoint of the police-whether in an interrogation or
during a pursuit-stack the cards against a suspect. The dynamic has been shown to be
potent enough to affect us all-judges and potential jury members alike. '11 In fact, the
Storms study suggests that video footage taken from the police's perspective may even
alter the interpretation and attributions of the suspect himself" 1
2
Yet, just like the participants in the experiments detailed earlier, we largely
overlook the biasing effect. So powerful is our blindness that alerting individuals "to
the potentially prejudicial effect of camera perspective [does] not mitigate the bias."'"13
Thus, research suggests that Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman's instruction to subjects that
"[t]he video [was] ... filmed from inside the pursuing police cruisers, ' 14 or a similar
instruction to members of an actual jury, would have little or no effect on relevant
cognition.' 1 Likewise, Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman's direction to "closely watch the
video ...just as [members of the jury in the case] would"' 1 6 is also unlikely to
counteract viewpoint bias as Lassiter and his colleagues have provided evidence that
encouraging careful deliberation and advising individuals "to be cognizant of reliability
and fairness concerns" does not have an appreciable effect." 
7
It is not just that we are blind to the potential for bias; it is also that we believe that
video holds special advantages over other evidence that makes it uniquely unbiased." 8
111. See Lassiter et al., supra note 91, at 224-25.
112. See Storms, supra note 78, at 165 (finding that individuals who viewed a videotape of a
conversation that they had participated in, shot from the perspective of their conversation
partner, attributed more of their own behavior in the exchange to dispositional causes rather
than situational causes); id. at 170 ("Under some circumstances actual role as actor or observer
is unimportant, and visual orientation is totally determinative of attributions.").
113. Lassiter et al., supra note 86, at 871.
114. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 855.
115. See Lassiter et al., supra note 86, at 871.
116. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 855 (quoting survey) (alteration in
original).
117. Lassiter, supra note 81, at 206; see Ratcliff et al., supra note 83, at 203 (stating that
"increasing people's sense of accountability for their judgments" and "explicitly warning" them
of potential bias has not been effective in eradicating camera perspective bias).
118. The ever-broadening support for videotape's employment in the courtroom is well
documented. See Lassiter et al., supra note 94, at 54 ("[I]t is estimated that more than half of
law enforcement agencies in the United States now videotape some interrogations."); Mimi
Samuel, Focus on Batson: Let the Cameras Roll, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 95, 109 (2008) (noting that
"in the past four decades the use of video in trial and appellate courts has exploded" and
suggesting "that this trend will only continue and expand"); Thomas P. Sullivan, Recording
Federal Custodial Interviews, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1297, 1311-12 (2008) (surveying state data
and explaining that "[a] movement is under way in the United States to adopt the practice of
recording custodial interviews of felony suspects. It involves legislatures, courts that directly or
indirectly compel the practice, and hundreds of individual departments that voluntarily
record."); Erwin Chemerinsky, A Troubling Take on Excessive-Force Claims, TRIAL, July 2007,
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We celebrate such recordings as offering unfiltered truth. i19 Indeed, ironically, one of
the most powerful appeals of the camera in the criminal law context comes in its
assumed benefits in protecting suspects from police abuse. 120 To stop coercion in the
police station, it makes intuitive sense that we should have a video recording of the
interactions between the suspect and police officers.' 2' To stop brutality on the
roadside, dashboard-mounted cameras seem to provide an obvious answer. In some
respects, the coming of the "video age" has promised an end to Arthur McDuffie
killings and Rodney King beatings' 22-- a new era in which the antisocial cop holds his
fist knowing that he is being monitored. And, while incidents of abuse have
continued, 23 there is also some evidence to suggest that dashboard cameras have
provided protections to certain suspects in certain contexts, helped victims to obtain
relief, and resulted in the termination of abusive officers and the review of enforcement
polices after the fact.' 24 Had Scott been pulled over, the existence of the camera may
at 74 ("[T]here will be more cases where judges at all levels can watch an incident for
themselves and come to their own conclusions about what happened.").
119. See, e.g., Silbey, supra note 82, at 116 ("Recorded custodial interrogations are widely
believed to protect defendants from coercive police tactics, promote prosecutions of the truly
guilty and preserve public confidence in the criminal justice system."); Sullivan, supra note 118,
at 1299-1300 ("I respectfully submit that not a single one of the reasons provided by the federal
agencies as a basis to oppose recording is valid."); id. at 1306 ("[C]omplete recordings of
custodial interviews save time and expense for all concerned, help to convict the guilty,
exonerate the innocent, shield police from false claims of misconduct, and protect suspects from
improper police behavior.").
120. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 621,687-88 (1996) (arguing videotaping police-citizen interactions is necessary
to reveal objective reality and shed light on police techniques); Wayne T. Westling, Something
Is Rotten in the Interrogation Room: Let's Try Video Oversight, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 537,
547-55 (2001) (arguing videotaping suspects would improve reliability in interrogations).
121. As Thomas P. Sullivan explains,
If police have acted outside the boundaries of the law-for example, by failing to
give Miranda warnings, using coercive or abusive tactics, or making inappropriate
promises or threats-defense lawyers may use the tapes with prosecutors to
prevent charges from being brought, to persuade judges to dismiss indictments, to
pursue motions to suppress evidence of their clients' statements, and to argue to
courts and jurors that their clients should be acquitted. Recordings will also reveal
whether or not police employed excessively prolonged questioning, or used other
unlawful tactics. Motions to suppress the use of the suspects' statements as
evidence are granted if the tapes reveal that Miranda warnings were not properly
given, or the suspects stated they wished to remain silent, or requested a lawyer, or
were subjected to improper interrogation techniques.
Sullivan, supra note 118, at 1308.
122. See Associated Press, Ex-Officer Tells Court of Role in Miami Cover-Up, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 1980, at All; Seth Mydans, Videotaped Beating by Officers Puts Full Glare on
Brutality Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at Al.
123. See, e.g., Tim Zatzariny Jr., Controversial Arrest Caught, Police Video,
MYCENTRALJERSEY.COM, Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.mycentraljersey.com/article/20090129/
STATE/90129019/0/rss I 1 (discussing the dashboard camera recording of the beating of Sheila
Stevenson by an officer).
124. In a recent Alabama case, Anthony Warren lost control of his vehicle and fell out of his
van after being pursued at high speeds by the police. See Nico Hines, Video: Alabama Police
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well have benefitted him too--potentially protecting him from harsh treatment at the
hands of officers angered at his disregard for their authority. 125 And yet, the social
psychology explored in this Article makes clear that it is foolish to consider the
relationship between the police camera and the suspect as uniform across contexts. The
benefits to certain suspects (e.g., where the suspect and officer are both depicted on
tape and the video is shot from a neutral third-party perspective) may well be
outweighed by the harm to others (e.g., where the video shows solely an officer's
perspective).
The PLMS perspective offers an essential missing component to the CCP because it
demonstrates that systematic bias to suspects ought to be the starting point of
discussion, even as we think about the impact of cognitive illiberalism on jury
dynamics. By engaging the social psychology concerning perspective bias, it is clear
that had the Supreme Court watched a different video of the exact same events taken
from inside Harris's car, this case may never have been taken away from a jury.
Indeed, it is worth questioning Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman's conclusion that the
"results [of their study] show that a substantial majority of the American public would
likely see the key facts in the manner the Supreme Court majority did."'126
Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman found that fifty-six percent of those surveyed
disagreed that the police chase was not worth the risk it posed to the public; seventy-
four percent of subjects assessed that Harris was more at fault for the risk; and seventy-
five percent believed that the use of deadly force was ultimately warranted.
127
However, the evidence presented in this Article suggests that these percentages may be
highly contingent on the viewpoint of the video. The American public may not have a
natural and unchanging "way" of perceiving this tragic accident. With a different tape,
modest-income African American women from the Northeast might not be an isolated,
marginalized subgroup who sees things differently from the majority. 128 With a
different camera perspective, important lines of division might disappear. In such a
scenario, the minority who see things differently from the Court after watching the tape
might, in fact, be idiosyncratic statistical outliers rather than members of groups who
share a distinctive understanding of social reality that informs their view of the facts.1
29
This possibility, of course, has powerful implications for Kahan, Hoffman, and
Braman's conclusion that the Court's "decision to privilege its view of a set of facts on
which even a minority of persons who share a set of defining commitments would
disagree stigmatizes those citizens as outsiders and in so doing delegitimizes the
Officers Sacked over Car Chase Beating, TIMES ONLINE, May 21, 2009, http://
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us-and-americas/article6335801.ece. While he lay
unconscious on the ground, officers approached and began severely beating him. Id. The
incident was recorded by a dashboard camera in one of the squad cars and led to the firing of
five police officers and a review of police policies and supervisory actions in Jefferson County.
Id. With the videotape as evidence, Warren also filed a compensation claim. Id.
125. But see Hines, supra note 124 (discussing suspect who fled from police and was
brutally beaten by officers after chase ended despite existence of dashboard camera).
126. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 881.
127. Id. at 865-66.
128. See id. at 872-79.
129. Cf id. at 886 (arguing the opposite: "Our data suggest that the minority who would see
things differently from the Court after watching the tape are not idiosyncratic statistical outliers;
they are members of groups who share a distinctive understanding of social reality that informs
their view of the facts" (emphasis in original)).
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law.' 130 From the perspective of the PLMS, the first order legitimacy question-in
both the descriptive and normative sense 3 1-is whether the court has approved a type
of evidence that is both powerfully influential, as to the outcome of a case, and biased
in a predictable direction. As this Article explores, the answer, based on the best
science available, is "yes." Ironically, the Supreme Court believed that by allowing the
videotape to be determinative, it was choosing an objective approach over a subjective
one, but instead, the Court was simply substituting a subjective approach favoring the
movant in the case for one designed to favor the nonmovant.'
32
The necessary implication of such a finding of systematic bias is that our justice
system ought to develop strategies to eliminate--or at least minimize-the impact of
camera perspective effects on those who come before our courts. There are numerous
potentially promising approaches that might be adopted: for example, in the future,
courts might avoid employing videotape evidence in the conclusive fashion that the
Supreme Court uses it, allow only certain parties (e.g., the defendant in a criminal trial)
to introduce footage, or permit only video shot from a viewpoint that does not
prejudice the accused to be viewed by a jury. In the context of videotaped
interrogations, Lassiter and his colleagues have advocated the last approach. As they
explain, "the surest way to prevent the camera perspective bias from happening is to
implement a policy that would preclude the possibility ofjudges or jurors ever seeing a
videotaped confession that focused exclusively on the suspect."'133 The same reasoning
seems applicable in the case of dashboard cameras.
34
By addressing this first order legitimacy question, it is likely that the second order
question that Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman address need not be reached. For example,
if courts only permitted neutral perspective videotape, the studies outlined in this
Article imply that a significant number of observers would make different attributions
for the depicted behavior. Because the bar for keeping the evidence away from the jury
is so low-simply whether the case presents a "genuine issue as to any material
fact"135-- even a slight change in cognition would result in a denial of summary
judgment. Thus, addressing perspective bias would eliminate the concerns that Kahan,
Hoffman, and Braman articulate relating to (1) denying jurors of different perspectives
the opportunity to persuade others to see things in a different way and (2) encouraging
a perception that members of certain subcommunities are to have no part in the judicial
process. 136
One potential response to the critique that camera perspective bias is distorting
outcomes in the courtroom is that such bias is unproblematic in cases like Scott v.
130. Id. at 887.
131. The authors define descriptive "legitimacy" as "the political acceptability of law-its
power to command voluntary compliance." Id. at 884. They define normative "legitimacy" with
respect to the "qualities that make the law morally worthy of assent." Id. (emphasis in original).
132. See infra text accompanying note 8.
133. Ratcliffet al., supra note 83, at 203; see also Lassiter et al., supra note 91, at 225
(noting that "New Zealand has already adopted such a policy").
134. As discussed later in this Article, in deciding how best to address the problem of camera
perspective bias, it is crucial to consider both the costs and benefits of any proposed reform. See
infra text accompanying note 221.
135. FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c).
136. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 904.
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Harris because the question presented is whether the implicated police officer acted
reasonably under the circumstances (i.e., was Officer Scott's use ofdeadly force to end
the chase reasonable?). 137 According to this argument, it is therefore appropriate that
the evidence presents events from the officer's perspective. Although seemingly
compelling, this response misses two critical factors. First, it is vital to remember the
standard of review in Scott: the case was at summary judgment, so a court was required
to consider the facts and draw any inferences "in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the [summary judgment] motion.' 138 Given such a requirement, it seems
inappropriate to view the facts from the visual perspective of the police officer since
this clearly favors his position (to the detriment of the nonmovant). Second, in deciding
whether Scott acted reasonably, it does not follow that the best and most accurate way
to answer that question is to view a videotape shot from inside his police cruiser. As
discussed later in this Article,' 39 the videotape leaves many potentially relevant visual
elements out-because they occurred before the camera was turned on or after it was
shut off, or because they occurred beyond the width of the screen, or because the
camera was not sensitive enough to capture details in low-light conditions. Scott may
have both seen and missed important things that are not captured on the tape.
Moreover, in determining whether Scott acted reasonably, it is erroneous to assume
that his visual perspective is the only one that matters, and it may be important to take
into consideration things that Scott could not have seen. For example, the perspective
of a news helicopter circling above might reveal that the road ahead had been sealed
off by other police cruisers, which may be standard practice in that jurisdiction and
thus something that Officer Scott should have expected. This reality may significantly
alter how we feel about the danger posed by Harris and the reasonableness of the
decision to ram his vehicle at high speed.
B. Toward a More Complete Model
The previous subsection suggested that to fully understand the processes at work in
Scott v. Harris it is important to look beyond cultural cognition and recognize the
additional importance of exterior situation in shaping the interpretation of behavior.
The Subpart, however, focused solely on camera perspective bias, and there are
numerous additional frames, primes, and other situational factors that may affect
cognition of significant facts in Scott. The discussion that follows examines the
potential impact of some of those additional exterior elements before considering how
camera perspective bias operates and interacts with those situational elements-
particularly implicit racial bias-to influence thought and action in systematic ways.
1. Other Exterior Situational Factors
As suggested in the discussion of situational framing, features in our physical and
social environment can influence, among other things, our beliefs, perceptions,
emotions, and behaviors. One of those features-with strong relevance to Scott-
137. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007).
138. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
139. See infra text accompanying notes 141-44.
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concerns our physical perspective on events, but there are many others as well. When
we interpret stimuli, we are creatures of exterior situation: we "perceive things as [we]
have been led by experience or suggestion to expect them to be, and [our] perceptions
are further biased by [our] hopes, fears, needs, and immediate emotional state," all of
which are subject to framing and priming. 140
Consider the Scott videotape. The tape constrained cognition because the sole
viewpoint offered was that of observing Scott's actions from Harris's position.
However, that perspective on events was itself limited temporally and spatially: in fact,
viewers did not see everything that the police officer saw or might have seen. Part of
this viewpoint limitation was a result of technological and physical limitations and part
of it was the result of decisions made by the police, the Supreme Court, and the
experimenters. 141 The camera does not show us what is offscreen, blocked in the frame,
too far away, or too dim to pick up. It does not show us what happened before or after
the tape: "It starts when the police activate their sirens and terminates with a scene of
Harris's flipped-over vehicle engulfed in thick smoke."' 142 Thus, at points, we, as
viewers, observe actions without seeing what spawned them---and yet we are called
upon to make attributions for those actions as if we have all of the relevant
information. 143 What if we were presented with the initial speeding incident, instead of
only after the sirens were turned on? If the video showed Harris driving in a seemingly
normal manner (albeit speeding) prior to the chase, might we feel differently about
causation and responsibility? How much might it matter if we were prevented from
seeing the accident itself or the aftermath? Or what if we saw more or less of it?144 It is
140. Emily Pronin, Carolyn Puccio & Lee Ross, Understanding Misunderstanding: Social
Psychological Perspectives, in HEURIsTIcs AND BIASES: THE PsYcHOLOGY OF INTUrIVE
JUDGMENT 636 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).
141. The police department, for example, set its cameras to record only at the moment that
the siren was engaged. See Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 855. And, although the
Supreme Court only offered two black-and-white videos on its website, there were four color
tapes that were included in the case record. See id. at 856; Scott, 550 U.S. at 395 n.7 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman then edited down the video footage still further to
fit the needs of their experiment, explaining that "[b]ecause only the footage shot from inside
the lead vehicle permits observation of Harris, the study video nevertheless contained all
portions of both tapes that bear on the factual disagreements between the Scott majority and
dissent." Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 856. These alterations and omissions
might, indeed, have been innocuous, but previous experience suggests the opposite. Perhaps no
better example is the surprising acquittal of Los Angeles Police Department officers involved in
the Rodney King beating. As Elizabeth Loftus and Laura Rosenwald explain, "While videotape
may be the most potent evidentiary tool since wiretapping, the Rodney King trial proved that a
skillful defense attorney can overcome its impact." Elizabeth F. Loftus & Laura A. Rosenwald,
The Rodney King Videotape: Why the Case Was Not Black and White, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1637,
1638 (1993). In the case, the defense managed to win an acquittal by reframing the events on the
tape-playing it "again and again on a big-screen television, often in slow motion" so that it
eventually was experienced as "'a disembodied video in a department store."' Id. at 1644-45
(quoting Tony Mauro, Anatomy of a Trial, USA TODAY, May 6, 1992, at A8).
142. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 855.
143. Again, the relevant questions for the Supreme Court and Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman
are about risk and blame. See id. at 855-56.
144. While the original video on the Court website showed several minutes of the aftermath,
2010]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
naive to think that viewing the plumes of smoke rising from the overturned car and the
frantic actions of the police to rescue the suspect did not frame the inquiry into the
blameworthiness of the police in creating the harm or the riskiness of the chase itself.
Seeing the horrible wreck may compel us to view the actions that led up to it as
dangerous and seeing the officers trying to help the suspect may influence our
interpretation of their characters as good (that is, not the type of people who would
endanger others). Likewise, if at the completion of the video we could make out
Harris's bloodied, broken body being removed from the burning car, our understanding
of the preceding events might very well be altered.1
4 5
The format of the videotape may also be biasing in another respect. It does not just
offer any perspective; it offers a perspective with which millions of Americans are
extremely familiar, in large part due to the first reality show on television, COPS.'4
For more than twenty years, COPS has taken members of the public along for rides in
squad cars, often in hot pursuit of suspects. 147 And, inevitably, when the police catch
up to the suspect, the pursued individual turns out to be violent, dangerous, drunk, a
liar, a drug addict, a parole violator, or a wanted criminal. The message, hammered
into our heads week in and week out, is clear: people who are being chased by the
police are "bad boys," just like the COPS' theme song says.148 When we are provided
with a COPS perspective, a particular narrative is engaged, and we immediately know
what to expect. 1
49
Even beyond the videotape itself, we may be subject to subtle cues that shape our
cognition of the depicted events. All of those watching the Scott video were aware that
they were to act in a certain role-differentiated manner, as a judge or juror in a
lawsuit.' 50 It is possible that being aware that the suspect was suing may have triggered
certain stereotypes about the motivations and propensities of tort claimants (i.e., they
are greedy people who are responsible for the harms they have suffered but look to
the video used in the study showed only a few seconds. Many of these questions might be
investigated experimentally in the future by editing existing police chase footage to create
different versions of the same chase and then asking participants to offer their assessments.
145. Cf Marina Krcmar & Kirstie Farrar, Retaliatory Aggression and the Effects ofPoint of
View and Blood in Violent Video Games, 12 MAss CoMM. & Soc'Y 115, 120 (2009) (noting
research on the effects of blood in television and film stimuli).
146. See COPS, http://www.cops.com/cops-history.html?PHPSESSID=bOaa924099c74bd25
e367655 1 d0e9930. It is also worth noting that the perspective is very common in video games,
in particular in widely popular "first-person shooter" games (e.g., Doom, Halo, and Bioshock).
See Krcmar & Farrar, supra note 145, at 119-20.
147. See COPS, supra note 146.
148. The song, "Bad Boys," by the reggae band Inner Circle, became a sensation in its own
right, selling more than seven million copies worldwide. See Ben Grossman, Bad Boys = Big
Money: Cops Has No Stars, No Plot and No Contests, and It's a Killer on T. V., BROADCASTING
& CABLE, July 31, 2005, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/159548-BadBoys_
BigMoney.php.
149. Cf. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses ofRace, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1489, 1539 (2005) (arguing
that sensationalistic local news reports repeatedly featuring racial minorities as violent criminals
exacerbate implicit biases against minorities with real world impacts).
150. The participants in the experiment, for example, were told "that the point of the survey
was to determine how they 'would decide a real-life lawsuit if [they] were on the jury."' Kahan
et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 854.
[Vol. 85:13331362
FRAMES OF INJUSTICE
blame others). 151 All of those watching the video were also aware that the driver was
paralyzed as a result of the accident.152 This knowledge might be expected to frame
things in a sympathetic light and lead to an attribution favorable to the driver, but "just
world" experiments conducted by social psychologists over the last decades suggest a
potential opposite effect: a tendency to blame the victim in similar situations.1
5 3
2. Placing Camera Perspective Bias in Context
Camera perspective bias does not operate in a vacuum, nor do any of the other
exterior situational factors just discussed. These factors interact with each other in
complex ways, just as they interact with interior situational elements. To unpack a case
like Scott, cultural cognition must be situated in the context of powerful situational
frames and, likewise, viewpoint bias must be placed within the broader set of
psychological dynamics governing interactions between suspects, police officers,
judges, and jurors. As the next Subpart illustrates, camera perspective bias may engrain
and accentuate the effects and prevalence of other biases.
a. Implicit Bias
One of the psychological dynamics that has enjoyed significant recent attention
from both scientists and legal scholars is implicit bias.' 54 Implicit biases are automatic
associations held by individuals often beyond their conscious awareness or control.1
55
In the intergroup context, such biases may reflect beliefs about typical group attributes
(that is, stereotypes) and affective responses to group members (that is, prejudice).156
Although psychologists have employed a number of different methods to study implicit
bias,157 the Implicit Association Test (IAT), developed by social psychologists Tony
151. See David A. Wenner, Juror Bias, in 3 ATLA's LITIGATING TORT CASES § 35:10
(Roxanne Barton Conlin & Gregory S. Cusimano eds., 2009).
152. See Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 855.
153. See Benforado et al., Broken Scales, supra note 28, at 1664-69 (summarizing various
experiments that reveal the "just world" phenomena).
154. Although they do not focus specifically on implicit biases, Kahan, Braman, and
Hoffinan are interested in "the subconscious influence of... cultural predispositions," which
would appear to include the impact of implicit biases. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8,
at 899.
155. See John T. Jost, Laurie A. Rudman, Irene V. Blair, Dana R. Carney, Nilanjana
Dasgupta, Jack Glaser & Curtis D. Hardin, The Existence ofImplicit Bias Is BeyondReasonable
Doubt: A Refutation ofIdeological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of
Ten Studies that No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 39,
43 (2009) ("[T]he contemporary consensus in the brain and behavioral sciences [is] that an
enormous amount of cognition occurs automatically, effortlessly, and outside of conscious
awareness."). For another good, recent overview of the field see Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang &
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. Soc. Sdi. 427 (2007).
156. Charles M. Judd, Irene V. Blaire & Kristine M. Chapleau, Automatic Stereotypes vs.
Automatic Prejudice: Sorting Out the Possibilities in the Payne (2001) Weapon Paradigm, 40 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 75, 76 (2004).
157. See Jost et al., supra note 155, at 46 ("The variety of methods used to study implicit
attitudes about a wide range of stimuli-including Stroop and lexical decision tasks,
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Greenwald, Mahzarin Banaji, and Brian Nosek, has been the most widely employed in
the "hundreds (if not thousands) of studies on implicit bias."' 58 Since 1998, more than
4.5 million IATs have been taken.159 As John Jost and his coauthors summarize,
The IAT gauges differences in how easy or difficult it is for people to associate
individual exemplars of various social categories (whites vs. blacks, rich vs. poor,
gay vs. straight, and so on) with abstract words and categories that have evaluative
implications (e.g., good vs. bad, pleasant vs. unpleasant). Thus, people who are
faster to categorize the faces or names of whites when they are paired with positive
(vs. negative) stimuli and, conversely, the faces or names of blacks when they are
paired with negative (vs. positive) stimuli, are theorized to have internalized a
stronger preference for whites relative to blacks, compared to people who respond
more equivalently across different category-valence pairings (or in the opposite
direction). 160
Overall, "about 70% of those who took a version of the test that measures racial
attitudes have an unconscious, or implicit, preference for white people compared to
supraliminal and subliminal priming procedures, and linguistic bias coding techniques-are
rooted in several decades' worth of research in cognitive and social psychology and are
rigorously empirical ...."); see also, e.g., Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming
Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 483,487-
88 (2004) (priming); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REv. 945, 950-53 (2006) (reaction time); Elizabeth A.
Phelps, Devin J. O'Connor, William A. Cunningham, E. Sumie Funayama, J. Christopher
Gatenby, John C. Gore & Mahrazin R. Banaji, Performance on Indirect Measures of Race
Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. CoGNIrVE NEUROSCIENCE 729,729-30(2000)
(brain scan).
158. Jost et al., supra note 155, at 64.
159. Project Implicit, General Information, http://www.projectimplicit.net/generalinfo.php.
On the website, readers can take a variety of different IATs.
160. Jost et al., supra note 155, at 45. More specifically,
The IAT assesses strengths of associations between concepts by observing
response latencies in computer-administered categorization tasks. In an initial
block of trials, exemplars of two contrasted concepts (e.g., face images for the
races Black and White) appear on a screen and subjects rapidly classify them by
pressing one of two keys (for example, an e key for Black and i for White). Next,
exemplars of another pair of contrasted concepts (for example, words representing
positive and negative valence) are also classified using the same two keys. In a
first combined task, exemplars of all four categories are classified, with each
assigned to the same key as in the initial two blocks (e.g., e for Black orpositive
and I for White or negative). In a second combined task, a complementary pairing
is used (i.e., e for White or positive and i for Black or negative). In most
implementations, respondents are obliged to correct errors before proceeding, and
latencies are measured to the occurrence of the correct response. The difference in
average latency between the two combined tasks provides the basis for the IAT
measure. For example, faster responses for the {Black + positive/White +
negative} task than for the {White + positive/Black + negative} task indicate a
stronger association of Black than of White with positive valence.
Anthony G. Greenwald, T. Andrew Peohhnan, Eric L. Uhlmann & Mahzarin R. Banaji,
Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive
Validity, 97 J. PERSONALtrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 18 (2009).
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blacks.' 61 As an automatic process, the tendency to associate positive concepts with
whites more easily than blacks "can exist even in those who espouse egalitarian
values"'162 and is shown by both whites and blacks, although, on average, blacks show
only a slight white preference as compared to the strong average white preference of
white participants. 163
It is not only "prevailing wisdom.., that IAT scores reveal implicit or unconscious
bias,"'164 it is also that "participants' implicit associations ... predict socially and
organizationally significant behaviors, including employment, medical, and voting
decisions."'165 Unconscious racial prejudice and stereotyping impact the judgments and
actions of police officers, just as they do with respect to students, doctors, and
employers. 166 Physicians with a white preference on the IAT, for example, provided
less effective treatments to hypothetical black coronary artery disease patients than to
white patients. 167 Likewise, individuals who demonstrated a strong implicit association
between blacks and crime, violence, and dangerousness 16 8 were more likely to shoot a
161. Posting of projectimplicit to Project Implicit Blog, http://projectimplicit.
wordpress.com/2009/06/19/predictive-validity-meta-analysis-of-the-implicit-association-test-is-
published (June 19, 2009, 13:13 EST).
162. Jennifer A. Joy-Gaba & Brian A. Nosek, The Surprisingly Limited Malleability of
Implicit Racial Evaluations 2 (2009) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law
Journal); see also Brian A. Nosek, Frederick L. Smyth, Jeffrey J. Hansen, Thierry Devos,
Nicole M. Lindner, Kate A. Ranganath, Colin T. Smith, Kristina R. Olson, Dolly Chugh,
Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit
Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18 EuR. REv. Soc. PSYCHOL. 36 (2007).
163. See Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Harvesting Implicit
Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMIcs 101, 105
(2002).
164. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1201 (2009); see
also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, "Science, " andAntidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REv. 477, 477 (2007).
165. Jost et. al., supra note 155, at 39.
166. Id. at 50.
167. See Alexander R. Green, Dana R. Carney, Daniel J. Pallin, Long H. Ngo, Kristal L.
Raymond, Lisa L. Lezzoni & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its
Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
1231, 1235 (2007).
168. The association has been shown to be bidirectional: "Black faces and Black bodies can
trigger thoughts of crime, thinking of crime can trigger thoughts of Black people." Jennifer L.
Eberhardt, Valerie J. Purdie, Phillip Atiba Goff& Paul G. Davies, Seeing Black: Race, Crime,
and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004). As Jennifer
Eberhadt and her colleagues summarize,
The stereotype of Black Americans as violent and criminal has been documented
by social psychologists for almost 60 years. Researchers have highlighted the
robustness and frequency of this stereotypic association by demonstrating its
effects on numerous outcome variables, including people's memory for who was
holding a deadly razor in a subway scene, people's evaluation of ambiguously
aggressive behavior, people's decision to categorize nonweapons as weapons, the
speed at which people decide to shoot someone holding a weapon, and the
probability that they will shoot at all.
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black target in a simulation than a white target engaging in identical behavior.' 69 As
Joshua Correll and his fellow researchers explain,
When ambiguous behavior is performed by an African American, it seems more
hostile, more mean, and more threatening than when it is performed by a White
person ....
... [because we] use the stereotypic association between the social category,
African American, and concepts like violence or danger as a schema to help
interpret ambiguous behavior on the part of any given African American target.17
0
In a 2009 review of 122 research reports considering the predictive validity of IAT
measurements for behavior, judgment, and physiological manifestations, Anthony G.
Greenwald and his coauthors considered thirty-two reports involving interracial
behavior between whites and blacks and found that for racial intergroup behavior, "the
predictive validity of IAT measures significantly exceeded the predictive validity of
self-report measures." 17 1 As Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and his colleagues concluded after
completing a study of implicit bias and judicial behavior supporting the conclusion that
judges, "just like the rest of us, carry implicit biases concerning race" and that "these
implicit biases can affect judges' judgment,"' 172 this disparity in behavior based on race
could be having
an enormous impact on outcomes in the criminal justice system .... Throughout
the processing of... cases, judges make many judgments concerning bail, pretrial
motions, evidentiary issues, witness credibility, and so forth. Each of these
judgments could be influenced by implicit biases, so the cumulative effect on
bottom-line statistics like incarceration rates and sentence length is much larger
than one might imagine. 73
And, it is worth emphasizing that judges are only one of the many actors within the
criminal justice system. Every day, jurors, witnesses, defense attorneys, prosecutors,
police officers, parole officers, and prison guards, among others, are also making vital
judgments that may be influenced by implicit racial bias.
Id. (citations omitted).
169. See Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd & Bemd Wittenbrink, The Police
Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity To Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J.
PERSONALTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1320-22 (2002); Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit
Motivation to Control Prejudice, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 164, 168-69 (2008).
170. Correll et al., supra note 169, at 1320 ("It is important to recognize that the proposed
process does not require a participant to dislike African Americans, or to hold any explicit
prejudice against them, nor does it require that the participant endorse the stereotype; it simply
requires that, at some level, the participant associates the two concepts 'African American' and
'violent."').
171. Greenwald et al., supra note 160, at 17, 32; see also Jost et al., supra note 155, at 46
("[T]he evidence for the predictive validity (or behavioral significance) of implicit bias.., is
already strong, and it continues to grow in depth and breadth.").
172. Rachlinski et al., supra note 164, at 1221.
173. Id. at 1201-02.
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Thus, it should not be surprising to learn that in the criminal justice system there are
extreme disparities with respect to racial outcomes. Studies have consistently
documented that officers employ "greater force, including lethal force, with minority
suspects than with White suspects.' 174 Forty percent of felony defendants are black,1
75
and a black male is over five times more likely to serve time in prison during his
lifetime than a white male.' 76 Blacks also receive significantly higher bail amounts,
177
are given longer sentences,17 8 and are more likely to be sentenced to death than their
white counterparts. 79 In fact, the more stereotypically black your features are, the more
likely you are to receive the death penalty.180 Particularly relevant to this Article, in
one study of Ohio court records, blacks were found to be "about twice as likely to get
[traffic] tickets as those who are not black. '' 8s And, since twenty-one percent of black
households do not have an automobile, the impact is actually starker. 8 2 Other studies
suggest that similar disparities exist around the United States.'
8 3
The potentially uplifting news is that there is some evidence that implicit biases and
resulting behavior are not set in stone: as Rachlinski and his coauthors summarize, if
people "are internally driven or otherwise motivated to suppress their own biases,
people can make judgments free from biases, even implicit ones."' 84 There have been a
number of approaches for overcoming implicit bias that have been put forward
including "cultivating egalitarian motives, exposing people to favorable,
counterstereotypical exemplars, providing opportunities for emotional reconditioning,
increasing vigilance about one's subtle behavior during interactions with disadvantaged
174. Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd, Melody S. Sadler, Bemd
Wittenbrink& Tracie Keesee, Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the
Decision To Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1006 (2007).
175. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE
URBAN COuNTIEs, 2004, at 1 (2004), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/fdluc04.pdf.
176. Burea of Justice Statistics, Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U.S. Population, 1974-
2001 (2003), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/ascii/piusp01 .txt.
177. See Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Testfor Race Discrimination in Bail Setting,
46 STAN. L. REv. 987, 992 (1994).
178. See David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence
from the US. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & EcON. 285, 300 (2001).
179. See David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Alan Weiner &
Barbara Broffitt, Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An
Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REv.
1638, 1651 (1998) (noting that "[w]hile blacks make up only thirteen percent of the nation's
civilian population, blacks make up forty-one percent of the nation's death row population.").
180. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Paul G. Davies, Valerie J. Purdie-Vaughns & Sheri
Lynn Johnson, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts
Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. Sci. 383, 383-84 (2006).
181. David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black"
Matters, 84 MINN. L. REv. 265, 267-68 (1999).
182. Id. at267.
183. Id. ("Statistics from cases in New Jersey and Maryland are similar. Sophisticated
analyses of stops and driving populations in both states showed racial disparities in traffic stops
that were literally off the charts." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
184. Rachlinski et al., supra note 164, at 1202 (citations omitted).
2010] 1367
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
others, and educating people about their implicit biases (i.e., 'unconsciousness
raising')."'8 5 In their recent study of implicit racial bias and judges in the criminal
justice context, for example, Rachlinski and his colleagues found that "when judges are
aware of a need to monitor their own responses for the influence of implicit racial
biases, and are motivated to suppress that bias, they appear able to do so."' 186 As they
caution, however, "[c]ontrol of implicit bias requires active, conscious control" and
"courtrooms can be busy places that do not afford judges the time necessary to engage
the corrective cognitive mechanisms that they seem to possess."'187 In addition, there is
a danger that judges might be "overconfident about their ability to avoid the influence
of race and hence fail to engage in corrective processes on all occasions.
' 188
b. A Vicious Circle
So how might implicit bias affect the operation and impact of perspective bias?
The Article to this point has focused on how interior and exterior situational factors
shape howjurors, judges, and others go about construing facts and making attributions
with respect to a given act or incident. However, interior situation and exterior
situation also play a role in the events that lead up to the act or incident.
Consider the progression illustrated in Figure 3, which models cognition and action
in a scenario with facts similar to Scott v. Harris.189 Imagine that an officer sees a black
man exceeding the speed limit in a high-crime area or, alternatively, imagine that an
officer joins a police chase already in progress involving a black driver not knowing
what prompted the chase. 190 The naive assumption is that the officer, equipped with
20/20 vision and a clean windshield in his cruiser, sees the unfolding scene in a neutral
and objective way-that is, he receives unfiltered reality.
However, in fact, in both instances, the exterior situation provides the officer with a
set of blinders that constrain how he sees and interprets the scene. Put differently, the
scene comes with a ready frame, and that frame may not only limit what draws the
officer's attention but may also trigger certain interior situational dynamics: in this
case, the powerful implicit association of blacks and crime.' 9'
185. Jost et al., supra note 155, at 56 (citations omitted).
186. Rachlinski et al., supra note 164, at 1221; see also Glaser& Knowles, supra note 169,
at 169-71 (finding that those demonstrating implicit racial bias who were also highly motivated
to control racial bias did not exhibit the same biased shooting behavior in a simulation as those
individuals who were not so motivated).
187. Rachlinski et al., supra note 164, at 1225.
188. Id. at 1226.
189. Note that the offered model is highly stylized and is meant to capture cognitive
processes in broad strokes. See infra notes 197-212 and accompanying text.
190. This latter scenario strongly parallels the facts from Scott in which the officer who
eventually instigated the crash joined the chase after it had begun and did not know the details
that led up to it. See Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807, 810 (1 1th Cir. 2005), rev'dsub
nom. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2008).
191. See R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimination andImplicit
Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1169, 1172 (2006) ("Psychologists have
documented and explored the longstanding stereotype of African Americans as violent and
prone to criminality. Indeed, this is the stereotype most commonly applied to Blacks--or at least
to young Black males." (citation omitted)).
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If the frame matters, what determines the nature of the frame? In general, the frame
(or frames) may be influenced by the task we are charged with, the physical location of
the actors and events, information we have received just prior to engaging the scene,
and countless other factors.192 When we see a black man wearing an old sweatshirt
running down the street, for example, the relevant cultural cognition is determined by
just such contextual elements-that is, different stereotypes about blacks may be
highlighted depending on how the interaction is framed. 193 If we are a police officer
looking for an unidentified suspect, the implicit association of blacks and crime maybe
particularly implicated: as a result, we may immediately assume the man is running
because he just committed a crime, and we may identify the object in his hand as a
gun.194 Alternatively, if we are aware that there is a popular basketball court down the
block, or if we have just finished watching an NBA game, the implicit association of
blacks and basketball may be implicated: as a result, we may assume that the man is
headed to a pickup game and see the same object in his hand as a small basketball
pump.' 95 Finally, if we are looking for our dog, which just ran out of the house when
we opened the door to carry in groceries, we may not even notice the black man at
all.196 Changing the frame of the action results in a significant shift in what is salient
and the triggered interior situation.
In the Scott scenario, the responding officer arriving on the scene is subject to
cultural cognition-indeed, if he is like most Americans, he carries strong implicit
racial associations. The fact that the suspect is black influences his attributions
regardless of the context, but the context (i.e., the exterior situational frame, including
the fact that the speeding takes place in a high-crime neighborhood or the fact that
police officers are already in pursuit with their lights flashing at the time the officer
encounters the scene) gives shape and intensity to those attributions.' 97 Together, the
192. Again, as Julie Seaman has summarized, "Many studies performed in recent years
support the proposition that situational elements-the physical, institutional, social, cultural,
and linguistic environment in which a person is situated-affect individual thought and action in
measurable and fairly predictable ways." Seaman, supra note 28, at 113.
193. See Eberhardt et al., supra note 168, at 877 ("[T]he Black racial category functions as
the prototypical associate for a number of ostensibly race-neutral concepts, such as crime, jazz,
basketball, and ghetto. These concepts may trigger clear, visual images of Black Americans.").
194. As Eberhardt and her colleagues suggest, "[S]imply thinking of crime can lead
perceivers to conjure up images of Black Americans that 'ready' these perceivers to register and
selectively attend to Black people who may be present in the actual physical environment." Id.
Of course, even without being primed with thoughts of crime, we are liable to interpret
ambiguous behavior by a black person as hostile, threatening, and criminal. See Correll et al.,
supra note 169, at 1320.
195. See Eberhardt et al., supra note 168, at 890 (providing evidence that the concept of
basketball is strongly associated with blacks and may thus produce changes in attentional
deployment).
196. See Daniel J. Simons & Christopher F. Chabris, Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained
Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events, 28 PERCEP'ION 1059 (1999) (offering evidence that
in dynamic scenes we perceive only details that receive our focused attention and referring to
this proclivity as "inattention blindness").
197. See Eberhardt et al., supra note 168, at 891 ("Activation of the crime concept not only
led police officers to attend to a Black face but also led them to misremember the Black face as
more stereotypical (i.e., representative) of the Black racial category than it actually was. Thus,
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interior and exterior situations provide a powerful and largely automatic narrative for
the officer: the reason that the driver is speeding and refuses to pull over is because he
is a dangerous criminal. Other potential explanations (e.g., the person is speeding
because he is late, afraid to linger around in a dangerous neighborhood, or just not
paying attention; the person is fleeing the police because he is drunk, young and
frightened, or mentally ill) are not even cognized because of the race of the suspect and
frame of the encounter. 1
98
The attribution, in turn, drives and justifies behavior: the police officer takes out the
suspect's car resulting in the suspect's paralysis. The particular choice of actions is,
again, likely impacted by implicit biases. Having made the determination that the
fleeing individual is a dangerous criminal, the choice of how to respond is still open:
should lethal force be used? It is worth considering whether the officer in the Scott
scenario would make the same determination if the driver was an elderly white woman
rather than a young black male. As noted above, blacks are considerably more likely to
die during the course of an interaction with a police officer than whites. 199 And,
possessing more stereotypically black features may increase the likelihood ofreceiving
harsh treatment even more.2°
At this point, the attributional work shifts to the jury or judge. As with the police
officer, the exterior situation provides a frame: as emphasized in this Article, part of
that frame is that the juror or judge watches a video of the incident that shows the
perspective of the pursuing police officers. 20 1 However, as discussed previously, there
are many other situational factors that influence cognition in predictable ways as
well.20 2 Neither the Supreme Court nor the test subjects in Kahan, Hoffman, and
Braman's experiment viewed the video without previously provided context, some of
which related to the suspect's identity. Documents in the record, for example, listed the
suspect's race, potentially triggering implicit racial associations in the Justices and
their law clerks.20 3 In addition, informal cues like the name of the suspect, the type of
vehicle (a late model Cadillac), the location of the chase, and the fact that the suspect
ignored the police car's flashing lights may have led both the Justices and the
participants in the experiment to assume that the suspect was black. °4
the association between blackness and criminality was not only triggered, it was magnified.").
198. One of Harris's lawyers, Andrew Clarke, readily acknowledged the influence of race on
the events: "I truly believe his initial police contact was profiled, but did not seek to develop
that proof." Email from Andrew Clarke, Attorney at Law, to Adam Benforado, Assistant
Professor, Drexel University Earle Mack School of Law (Aug. 31, 2009, 08:10 EST) (on file
with author).
199. See JODI M. BROWN & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, POLICING
AND HOMICIDE, 1976-98: JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE BY POLICE, POLICE OFFICERS MURDERED BY
FELONS 5 (2001); see also Correll et al., supra note 174, at 1007 ("[M]inority suspects are
disproportionately likely to be shot.").
200. See Eberhardt et al., supra note 180, at 384 ("[D]efendants whose appearance was
perceived as more stereotypically Black were more likely to receive a death sentence than
defendants whose appearance was perceived as less stereotypically Black.").
201. See supra Part II.A.
202. See supra Part II.B.I.
203. Email from Andrew Clarke, supra note 198 (noting that race, however, was not a focus
of any of the briefs or arguments before the Supreme Court).
204. Again, "simply thinking of crime can lead perceivers to conjure up images of Black
Americans." Eberhardt et al., supra note 168, at 877. In my seminar, the students all assumed
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Taken together, these exterior situational factors drive certain cultural cognitions,
which lead to an attribution, for many, that the suspect created the danger that resulted
in his ultimate injury.
We are largely oblivious to the fact that interior or exterior situations are having
such a profound impact. Many of us know that we are not "racist"-indeed, we are
committed to equal treatment for all people-and therefore it seems absurd to suggest
that we could carry implicit biases against blacks. It is equally ridiculous to suggest
that when we are watching events unfold with our own eyes something as small as the
camera angle could influence our attributions. And, as naive realists confident in our
objectivity, it is clear that our backgrounds and experiences are put to the side when we
get down to the matter of "judging."20 5 Our blindness to these biasing factors means
that attributions that ought to be questioned and contested are left unconsidered. And,
our confidence in our neutrality and clear-sightedness in the judging process lends
legitimacy to potentially illegitimate outcomes, not only in the sense that the police
may have created the dangerous situation of the chase, but also because the initial
chase and perhaps even the decision to use lethal force may have been influenced by
the suspect's race.
The added twist here is the presence of a videotape of the central events, which both
biases perception in a predictable way and largely eliminates concerns about the
existence or impact of bias on the outcomes. As discussed previously, there is evidence
that implicit biases can be suppressed when individuals "are aware of a need to monitor
their own responses for the influence of implicit racial biases, and are motivated to
suppress that bias." 2°6 But therein is the key danger with respect to the videotape: it lets
judges and jurors off the hook. With the videotape seeming to so clearly capture reality
exactly as it happens, judges and jurors come away with the mistaken impression that
whatever biases they might have had in interpreting ambiguous testimony or other
evidence, they could not possibly have brought any bias to watching the videotape
because there is no room for "interpretation." With the videotape for any doubters to
view with their own eyes:20 7 judges no longer "face clear cues that risk a charge of
bias. 208 There is no longer "a need to monitor their decisions for racial bias. ' ° And,
this cleansing of doubt facilitated by the videotape absolves the police officers as well:
knowing the data on racially disparate outcomes with respect to interactions with the
police, it might be easy for a judge or juror to imagine that bias played a role in the
police chase, but not when there is a videotape that seems, so clearly and objectively,
to show reasonable actions. The videotape allows ajudge to say, "I've heard about the
implicit bias research and I know that in general more blacks are being subjected to
police stops and police chases, and injured by police officers-and those things would
give me pause-but in this case, I can rest assured that bias had nothing to do with the
the suspect was black, although I pointed out that his race is not mentioned in the Supreme
Court opinion or the Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman study. See Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra
note 8, at 854-55.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 41-57 (discussing na'fve realism).
206. Rachlinski et al., supra note 164, at 1221.
207. As noted previously, in Scott, the Supreme Court made the video available for public
viewing on its website and encouraged the public to watch. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378
n.5 (2008); id. at 387 (Breyer, J., concurring).
208. Rachlinski et al., supra note 164, at 1225.
209. Id. at 1221.
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accident or my denial of a claim because I have the videotape to show me exactly what
actually happened."
This purification effect, eliminating any concerns about bias, is particularly
damaging because the potentially illegitimate outcome in this case-finding that a
black suspect was, indeed, a menace, a lethal threat, and at fault-helps to further
engrain an implicit association between blacks and crime, violence, and danger. As
Rachlinski and his colleagues have explained in a related context, "Frequent exposure
to black criminal defendants is apt to perpetuate negative associations with black
Americans., 210 This exposure, in turn, may result in further-or even increased-
discriminatory treatment by police officers already exhibiting the effects of implicit
bias.21' The legitimating frame of the videotape-along with what Timothy Wilson has
referred to as our "default response . . . to assume that [our] judgments are
uncontaminated" 21 2-protects the status quo and means that officers are never
confronted by others telling them that they may be acting based on implicit biases.
Officers-and just as important, police departments-therefore have no reason to
attempt to control for such biases.
A final concern is that while, for many viewers, the videotape may reinforce a sense
of legitimacy regarding the determinations and actions of police officers, judges, and
jurors that have a disparate impact on African Americans, that may not be the case for
black viewers. Blacks may be less influenced by the situational frame-or, at least,
may perceive things differently enough as a result of cultural cognition that they remain
skeptical of the police's role.213 The result may be further racial division, with majority
members certain that blacks are illegitimately playing "the race card" given the clarity
and objectivity of the videotape and blacks sensing that the judicial system (and its
employees) must be biased in the explicit, conscious sense. As Joshua Correll and his
coauthors have described, "In response, Black people may engage in more belligerent
behavior, including 'talking back' to police officers, and-in a vicious cycle-this
210. Id. at 1227 ("This exposure perhaps explains why capital defense attorneys harbor
negative associations with blacks, and might explain why we found slightly greater negative
associations among the white judges than the population as a whole."); see also id. at 1222
("[O]verrepresentation of black Americans among the criminal defendants who appear in front
of judges might produce invidious associations that overwhelm their professional
commitment."); cf Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of
Death Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 1539, 1540 (2004).
211. See Correll et al., supra note 174, at 1014.
Officers serving in districts characterized by a large population, a high rate of
violent crime, and a greater concentration of Black people and other minorities
showed increased bias in their reaction times [in shooter studies]. We tentatively
suggest that these environments may reinforce cultural stereotypes, linking Black
people to the concept of violence. The fact that officers from these urban, violent
areas show more pronounced bias in their latencies suggests that stereotypic
associations may indeed influence police on some level.
Id.
212. Timothy D. Wilson, David B. Centerbar & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and
the Debiasing Problem, in HEuIusrlcs AND BIASES, supra note 140, at 185, 190.
213. Indeed, Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman found "that being African American (as opposed
to white) exert[ed] the largest effect across various response measures [concerning assessments
of the Scott videotape]." Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8 at 867.
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belligerence may prompt more severe use of force by police.' 214 Indeed, this dynamic
may help unpack one of the mysteries of the Scott v. Harris case: why the suspect,
Harris, who seemingly had no reason to run (other than avoiding getting a speeding
ticket) chose to evade the police in the first place. With truly objective forms of
evidence and a vigorous appreciation of the potential for bias, the disparate impact on
minority suspects that engenders a sense of mistrust and victimization would ease, and
black men and women like Harris would be less inclined to flee.
214. Correll et al., supra note 166, at 1006-07.
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Figure 3: The Bias Cycle
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II. THE BROADER OUTLOOK
In this Article, the focus has been on exploring the influence of exterior and interior
situations on cognition in a particular context-a videotaped police chase-but the
same dynamics are implicated in countless other interactions. And, while situational
frames are having an impact on how we make sense of events and construe behavior in
a wide variety of circumstances, we remain largely oblivious to their power both as
legal actors and as legal scholars.
A. The Many Cameras of Criminal Law
Considering just criminal law, perspective bias may be having a more expansive
distorting effect than suggested in the previous pages, in part, because patrol-car
cameras are not the only source of potentially biasing videotape recorded by the
state. 2 1 5 As already discussed, perspective bias appears to influence the interpretation
of taped police interrogations and suspect confessions.2 6 In addition, the placement
and use of surveillance cameras may implicate viewpoint framing. In several countries,
most notably Great Britain, closed-circuit television cameras have become ubiquitous
and have taken a central role in law enforcement and counterterrorism activities.27
Major U.S. cities have shown an increasing affinity for such monitoring in deterring,
solving, and prosecuting crimes. Chicago, for example, has a network of 2200
surveillance cameras, 21I and Philadelphia has recently installed about a tenth of that
number.219 Certain jurisdictions also use handheld or officer-mounted cameras to
record the actions of members of the public, and may occasionally use hidden video
recorders for sting operations or undercover work.220 Moreover, law enforcement and
prosecutors sometimes rely on private video footage taken by business surveillance
cameras, news programs, and citizens capturing events with cameras and cell phones.
Finally, videoconference technology is occasionally used for witnesses during trial. All
of these formats potentially involve camera perspective bias.
Consequently, the concerns raised in this Article may be more pervasive and
damaging than previously suggested. Going forward, it is critical to weigh the potential
benefits of employing these cameras-with respect to preventing and prosecuting
crime-against the potentially significant costs to fairness, justice, and judicial
215. Concerning squad-car recordings, camera perspective may be important with respect to
police stops, as well as pursuits.
216. See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
217. It is estimated that there are 4.8 million cameras in operation in the country. Paul Lewis,
Every Step You Take: UK Underground Centre That Is Spy Capital of the World, GUARDIAN,
Mar. 2, 2009, at 13.
218. See Fran Spielman, Is Chicago Safe from a Terrorist Attack?, Cin. SuN-TIMEs, Jan. 8,
2007, at 08.
219. See Philadelphia Police Eyes in the Sky, CBS3.coM, Mar. 11, 2009,
http://cbs3.com/technology/Philadelphia.Police.Cameras.2.957006.html. The Philadelphia
cameras can pan, tilt, and zoom, and will soon be able to automatically turn towards loud
sounds, like gunshots. Id.
220. See, e.g., Ian Noble, It's the Long Lens of the Law, N. ECHO (U.K.), Mar. 19,2008, at
31 (discussing a police helmet-mounted camera).
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legitimacy suggested in the previous pages. 221 Not all types of video recording present
the same challenges, and it is important to be cognizant of when viewpoint bias may
cause significant distortions and when it may not. On a similar note, video footage may
be utilized in one context without controversy (for example, to identify a witness), but
be deeply problematic when employed in another (for example, to establish facts at
summary judgment in a determinate manner).
While this Article has addressed the impact of exterior situational cues and frames
on videotape evidence, the deeper purpose has been to raise awareness of the potential
that all evidence has to subtly bias judicial proceedings beyond our conscious
awareness. There are reasons to think that video evidence is uniquely potent, but a
written police report or witness statement on the stand may contain powerful frames
that shape outcomes as well.222 As we move forward, we must not shy away from
confronting the possibility that the basic tools of our legal system are less objective and
neutral than we always hoped and expected.
B. Overlooking Relevant Frames in Other CCP Work
Although only one article in the CCP was explored in this Article, the critique of the
approach is more broadly applicable. Indeed, overlooking the role of situational
framing appears to be a recurring limitation to this otherwise extremely valuable
scholarly endeavor.
For example, in a recent solo article exploring cultural cognition in the context of
the debate over rape law reform, Kahan showed that a hierarchical worldview
encouraged subjects to perceive that the defendant in an "acquaintance rape" scenario
modeled on Commonwealth v. Berkowitz223 reasonably concluded that the plaintiff
consented to intercourse despite her verbal objections, whereas an egalitarian
worldview did not.224 Moreover, "[t]he effect of hierarchy in inclining subjects to favor
acquittal was greatest among women."221 As in Scott v. Harris, "cultural differences in
outcome judgments [appeared to] reflect cultural differences in perceptions of the
221. In Great Britain, for example, it was estimated that just three percent of crimes were
solved with the aid of closed-circuit television. See Lewis, supra note 217. Philadelphia, by
contrast, has touted their relatively small new network of cameras as an extremely effective
crime fighting tool, which has aided in solving over one hundred crimes injust five months. See
Philadelphia Police Eyes in the Sky, supra note 219.
222. Even the simple wording of a lawyer's question can act as a significant frame, shaping
cognition. In a classic study conducted over thirty-five years ago, researchers showed
participants a video of a car accident. Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of
Automobile Destruction: An Example of the Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J.
VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 585 (1974). They then asked the participants to estimate
how fast the cars were moving at the moment of impact, varying only how the impact was
described. Id. at 585-86. The simple word choice---"contacted," "hit," "bumped," "collided," or
"smashed"-turned out to matter greatly: when the word "smashed" was used, participants
estimated that the cars were traveling nine miles per hour faster than when participants were told
that the cars "contacted." Id. at 586 (emphasis omitted).
223. 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
224. Kahan, supra note 21, at 3-4.
225. Id. at 1 (emphasis in original).
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facts. 226 And, more affirmatively than in Scott v. Harris, Kahan actively disregarded
the possibility that the exterior situation might be playing an important role in
227
cognition.
The problem, however, was that Kahan only focused on a small aspect of that
exterior situation: the legal definition of rape, which his study showed only had a
"minimal influence on the judgment that rape either did or did not occur.' 22s There are
many factors beyond cultural predispositions and legal definitions that may play a role
in how facts are perceived in a rape case. The inclusion of seemingly irrelevant details
may powerfully frame matters and alter attributions. In an experiment some thirty-five
years ago, for example, Cathaleene Jones and Elliot Aronson discovered that they
could change the way subjects assessed the culpability of a victim in a rape scenario
simply by changing how she was identified. 229 Keeping all other details the same, when
the victim was described as "a virgin," participants in the experiment deemed her to be
more responsible for the rape than when she was described as "a married woman.,
230
And, when she was described as a "divorcee," the woman was deemed to be the least
responsible of all.
The vignette that Kahan used in the experiment is treated, similarly to the videotape
in Scott v. Harris, as if it presents a neutral picture of the key events, but it contains
countless cues and frames that may determine what relevant cultural cognition is
triggered. Once again, "different people, with different experiences, can [perceive]
different things";"' yet, just as crucial, the same person can also perceive different
226. Id. at 55.
227. Id. at 56.
228. Id. One might, in fact, quibble with the "minimal" label, as, in the study, "a definition
that treats proof the complainant said 'no' as sufficient to establish lack of consent and (when
the defendant heard her) the requisite mens rea did increase the proportion of subjects who
agreed the defendant had raped the complainant... [by] around 10%." Id. at 57; see also id. at
58 ("That even a small but meaningful number of subjects would feel constrained to adapt their
moral views to their outcome judgments was contrary to the study hypothesis, and marks an
important qualification on the cultural cognition thesis, which in its strongest form predicts that
individuals will conform their perceptions of the facts and resulting outcomejudgments to their
cultural predispositions as a means of avoiding dissonance." (emphasis in original)); id. at 60
("It's conceivable, the study results suggest, that the more radical form of treating the word 'no'
as dispositive proof of the complainant's lack of consent and the defendant's mens rea would
increase the willingness of even hierarchs to convict in such a case. But the effect of this
formulation remains weak compared to the strength of cultural styles.").
229. Cathaleene Jones & Elliot Aronson, Attribution ofFault to a Rape Victim as a Function
of Respectability of the Victim, 26 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 415, 416-17 (1973).
230. Id. The experiment offered a powerful confirmation of the human motive to see the
world as "just" even if that means dispositionalizing the victim. See Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T.
Miller, Just World Research and the Attribution Process: Looking Back and Ahead, 85
PSYCHOL. BuLL. 1030, 1035 (1978) ("[T]he knowledge that innocent, highly respectable females
can be raped was particularly threatening to the subjects' belief that the world is just, and to
avoid the threat posed by this type of admission, it was necessary to find fault with the actions of
the victim. Thus, the subjects appear to have tried to convince themselves that the victim was
really not innocent and that she must have contributed, at least in some small but significant
way, to her fate.").
231. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 8, at 848 (emphasis in original). Kahan's
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things depending on how information is presented and the broader context in which it
is processed.
CONCLUSION
In the end, for all of the things that Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman get right-and for
all that the CCP adds to our understanding of human behavior-the scholars are
incorrect that "the only thing that is manifestly wrong about the decision" in Scott is the
Court's insistence "that the videotape supported only one 'reasonable' view of the
facts. 232 Taking seriously the insights and approach of the PLMS makes that clear.
Exterior situational elements and dynamics are not background to be ignored as we
focus on actors acting and work to understand what, inside of them, propels their
behavior. At every moment, situational influences in our environments are having
subtle-and often not-so-subtle--effects on all that we see, think, and do. In the future,
one can hope that both proj ects-with their common tools and common goals-engage
each other further. Only then can we make real progress in revealing the realities of
cognition necessary to ensure that our legal rules are just and that our system is
legitimate.
experiment is of great value in offering evidence for this important dynamic and the suggestion
that exterior situation ought not to be left out of the analysis should be understood as an
argument in favor of expanding the realm of inquiry, rather than as a criticism.
232. Id. at 881.
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